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THE RUSSIAN AND ANGLICAN HIERARCHIES.

“IN the eyes of Rome,” says Father Gagarin, “the Russian Bishops are true Bishops, and the Russian priests true priests.” This conclusion was not admitted with regard to a considerable portion of the hierarchy without some very sharp disputes,—disputes similar to those which are now with the same breath being both invited and deprecated in England. There are, if we are to believe Mr. Henry Collins, a recent convert, many Anglicans who have been prevented becoming Catholics only by the “bitterness of the tone” of some of us. “The number of conversions that has been impeded, or altogether hindered, can never be fully known.” Among “bitternesses of tone,” our opinion of the invalidity of English orders holds a foremost place; we ought for the sake of peace either to change it or to conceal it.

“What right has any Catholic to press upon Anglicans, and to insist upon it, that their Bishops are mere laymen? The Church has never decided it, or spoken positively: no man may therefore speak positively of it (!). It is an open question; and in winning over others whose faith is any way different, all open questions are better avoided, especially if they wound the feelings of those we would gain. To speak disagreeable things is never the way to win men; they should never, then, be spoken except when absolutely necessary. Why take a pleasure in hunting out methods of annoying one whom we would convert? The fact that Anglicans value orders is a point on our side; for if they value them, they value their absolute certainty. But the point being open, Catholics may, and some do, hold the opinion that Anglican orders are valid, and that, if they are not certain, yet a very great deal more can be said for their validity than for the contrary part; but it is enough that, upon an open question, it is highly impolitic to exasperate one whom we would win. The belief in orders is one more point upon which

the Anglican Church holds the true faith in union with Catholics. It is a very great blessing that one hindrance to unity is taken away, and a greater still it were, if, upon examination, their orders should be pronounced valid by authority. It is an essential point for the Church to have orders, but the having orders does not make any church the Catholic Church, nor part of it either. The Nestorian heretics, the Copts, &c., have orders, but are no part of the Church, though this is a point of union between them and the Church which has providentially been preserved. The Donatists had orders, and held the Catholic faith; their position was not because of this justifiable; on the contrary, holding so much, it was the more unjustifiable that they should have continued separate from the Catholic Church, and strangers to the promises."*

We do not wish to hurt any one's feelings; but we do not see why compassion should take the place of argument, or why we should refrain from urging on people who think themselves safe with their sacraments, that their orders have ever been considered doubtful in the Church, and that converts from their body are ordained afresh under the eyes of Popes, without the smallest consideration for the ordinations of the Anglican Bishops. It is surely a topic that may be discussed without exasperation. Now that the Nag's-Head story is shown to have been a mistake, we should be the last to re-affirm it: but, at the same time, the representatives of those who banished, imprisoned, robbed, and hanged the Catholics; who shut up, as far as might be, all sources of information from them; who burnt their books, dispersed their schools, and used every means that an unprincipled ingenuity could suggest to prevent their ever knowing the exact state of affairs, ought to be careful not to call that fable a "foul lie." It was not a foul lie,—it was a natural mistake; and it was natural to mistrust the refutations of it when they were produced by men convicted before of manifold misrepresentations, and were founded on documents which it was supposed might easily have been forged. It was not their fault if the English Catholics, as Bramhall reproaches them, "were great strangers to the true passages of those times, knowing nothing but what they heard at Rome, Rheims, or Douai."

With respect to the ordinations of the Oriental Churches in general, there is no more doubt than there is of the Latin ordinations; that is, there is none at all. The doubts that have arisen concerning the validity of some of the Russian consecrations have their origin in a fact which happened as lately as 1630, and of which we proceed to give an account.

At the Council of Florence, Isodore, metropolitan both of

* *Difficulties of a Convert*, by H. Collins, M.A. (Dolman, 1857), p. 9.

Kief and Moscow, had been one of the most zealous promoters of the union. On his return to his sees, he caused this great act to be accepted at Kief, and its suffragan dioceses, Bransk, Smolensk, Peremyszl, Turow, Wladimir in Volhynia, Polock, Chelm, and Halitz; but he failed entirely in the province of Moscow. Even at Kief the union only lasted till the beginning of the sixteenth century.

Nevertheless the greater part of the Bishops and clergy of Kief again renounced their schism in 1594 and 1595 at the famous councils of Brest. The Bishops of Peremyszl and Lemberg alone, under the influence of Constantine, prince of Ostrog, refused to be re-united. They soon died; and the non-uniates of Poland,—for a portion of the people refused to follow its Bishops,—were left without a head, and even without any hope of obtaining one; for the laws of Poland forbade the consecration of a Bishop without the king's consent. Sigismund III. was firm; neither prayers, nor remonstrances, nor reasons of policy moved him; and in 1620, when the Cossacks, who were called out to fight against the Turk in Wallachia, threatened to desert his flag if he any longer refused them a schismatic metropolitan, he answered them, "I will rather lose my crown and go into exile than consent to the renewal of the schism."

But for the last three years there had been residing in Muscovy an envoy of the Sultan, who assumed the title of Patriarch of Jerusalem. Nobody seems to have had a doubt of his being really Theophilus, patriarch of the Holy City. He was even requested to preside at the installation of Philarete as patriarch of Moscow, and to confirm the re-establishment of the patriarchate of that city, which had been first instituted in 1588 by Jeremias II., the deposed patriarch of Constantinople. But these acts can have no influence on the decision of the question in hand. Philarete, the father of the Tsar Michael Feodorowitch, and the stock of the imperial house of Romanoff, had been metropolitan of Rostoff before he was taken prisoner by the Poles; and after he regained his liberty he became head of the Russian orthodox Church. It is an error, then, to say that Philarete was consecrated by the pretended patriarch of Jerusalem; he received from him no sacramental imposition of hands, but only installation in the patriarchal chair. No objection, then, can be brought against the orders of the Bishops consecrated by the patriarch Philarete.

But Theophilus did not stop with installing the patriarch of Moscow. The Cossacks, taking advantage of the wars and difficulties into which Sigismund III. was plunged, caused

this mysterious personage to come to Kief, where, without the assistance of any other Bishop, he proceeded, August 15, 1630, to consecrate three Bishops: Job Borecki anti-metropolitan of Kief, Meleci Smotricki anti-archbishop of Polock, and Joseph Kuscewicz anti-bishop of Wladimir. Some time after, he consecrated four more Bishops: Isaias Boriskowicz Czerczicki anti-bishop of Luck, Isaias Kopinski anti-bishop of Peremyszl, Païsius Hippolytowicz anti-bishop of Chelm, and Abraham Stragouski anti-bishop of Pinsk. All these sees were then occupied by united Ruthenian Bishops.

One can fancy the troubles that followed the enterprise of Theophilus. The schismatic Bishops soon succeeded in filching from the Catholic prelates a good portion of their flocks; they took forcible possession of the churches, drove away the Catholics, and in a short time destroyed the fruit of twenty years' labours. As all this was done in contempt of the laws of the state, Sigismund, far from recognising these Bishops, issued an edict for their apprehension; but by means of disguises and other precautions they managed to escape pursuit, and even to visit the churches, and to ordain every where priests opposed to the union.

They were soon strong enough to begin persecuting the Catholics. Wladislas IV., who succeeded his father Sigismund in 1632, felt himself obliged to command the Catholics to give up the churches to the anti-unionists; he called the schismatics to the senate, and allowed them to have an episcopate on nearly the same footing as the Catholic Ruthenian hierarchy. This schismatical episcopate has been continued to our day.

It is in relation to these Bishops that the question of the validity of their consecration has place. Of course there is no question about their *legitimacy*; no one can be a legitimate Bishop unless he is in communion with the universal Church built on the authority of St. Peter and his successors: the simple question is, whether the ordinations of Kief are valid; whether, that is, the anti-unionist Bishops of that province really have the episcopal character; for as baptism administered by heretics is valid when there is no essential change in form, matter, or intention,—so orders administered by heretics or schismatics are valid as long as all that is necessary is observed; that is to say, as long as they are conferred with the prescribed forms by a Christian who has the episcopal character.

From the very first there have been Polish Catholics who have maintained the consecrations made by the pretended patriarch of Jerusalem to have been null. They depended

on two proofs : first, that the essential forms had not been observed ; secondly, that the consecrating Bishop had not the episcopal character.

They pretended that a consecration made without the presence of three Bishops, as prescribed by the canons, is null, except in cases where the Holy See permits the consecrating Bishop to be assisted by two priests.* Now it was publicly notorious that the consecrating Bishop had no assistant whatever. This is the same argument afterwards used against the consecration of the first Jansenist Bishop of Holland, who was consecrated by the archbishop of Babylon alone. Now, as no one could maintain the validity of these illegitimate orders in Belgium or Holland, without being almost reckoned an adherent of the schism of Utrecht ; so in Poland, in the midst of the passions awakened by the events at Kief, a man was obliged to declare that Job Borecki and company were not real Bishops, because three Bishops had not taken part at their consecration.

This argument went too far ; for though the canon which prescribes the presence of three Bishops ought to be religiously observed, yet it does not thence follow that it is of divine right, and that its non-observance entails the nullity of the act. Could the Pope ever dispense with it, if it were essential to the Sacrament ? What Catholic nowadays calls in question the validity of the schismatical ordinations of Utrecht ? And how can they be attacked, without attacking the consecration of Pope Pelagius I., who received the imposition of hands from two Bishops only, assisted by one priest ? It is certain that the Council of Sardica commands any Bishop who happens to be the sole remaining one in any ecclesiastical province to consecrate Bishops for the towns that require them, without allowing the neighbouring Bishops to have a hand in these consecrations, except when the above-mentioned Bishop refuses to make them. Who would reject the orders of those Bishops who, according to the testimony of the first Council of Arles were often consecrated in France by a single Bishop, or of those who, in conformity with the apostolic canons, were consecrated by two ? Who would call the consecration of John of Châlons invalid, given, as St. Sidonius Appolinaris affirms, by Patiens of Lyons alone ? Who ever called in question the orders of the Catholic Church in England, where St. Gregory the Great dispensed with the presence of any assistants whatever, and wrote to St. Augustine, " In the English Church, wherein there is no other Bishop but thyself, thou canst not ordain a Bishop otherwise than

* As allowed by St. Thomas Aq., sum. iii, q. lxxii. art. 11, ad 1.

alone"? Who objects to Bellarmine for allowing that in case of necessity a Bishop and two mitred abbots may consecrate a Bishop? * The Council of Riez, in invalidating the ordination of the Bishop of Embrun, because it was only performed by two Bishops, yet implicitly allows it when it permits the deposed Bishop to confirm, and the new Bishop to continue the priests ordained by the deposed one in their offices. It is clear that the sentence had reference to the irregularity of the proceeding, and not to the validity of the Sacrament.

To put forth, then, the principle, that no consecration which is not performed by three Bishops is valid, is to raise doubts about all ordinations. For what Bishop could ever be sure that among his ancestors in the priesthood there are not some such as those spoken of in the councils above mentioned?

The second argument against the validity of the orders of the non-united Bishops of the province of Kief has the same flaw. Not that we pretend to defend Strahl, who, in his *Russian Church History*, can only see through the spectacles of the Russian orthodox writers; nor Count Krasinski, who writes solely in the interests of Protestantism in the Slavonic provinces; nor the Dominican Lequien, in his *Oriens Christianus*, written from the Catholic point of view; who all assure us that it was really Theophilus patriarch of Jerusalem who came into Muscovy and re-established the non-uniatic hierarchy of Kief. We will allow that his name was not Theophilus, but Theophanes; with James Susza, the author of the Latin life of the Blessed Josaphat Kuncewicz, we will admit that he was but a pretended patriarch, *uti se nominabat patriarcha Hierosolymitanus*; that he was a *pseudo-patriarch*, as the Jesuits Cordara and Albert Viak call him; that he was only a quack, *circulator*, brought from Greece by the Russian monks and Popes, and that his magnificent title of Patriarch turned to the disgrace of the schism as soon as it was proved that he had no right to it, as Viak again says; lastly, that he was merely a vagabond sycophant, *sycophantes vagabundus*, who usurped the pompous title of Patriarch of Jerusalem, as the theologian John Aloysius Kulista calls him. We admit that all these hard words are deserved; but it by no means follows from thence that Theophilus, or Theophanes, had not the episcopal character. All those who were most directly interested in knowing whether he was truly a Bishop, were convinced that there was no doubt whatever on the matter.

Our proofs are these: Meleci Smotricki, who had been ordained by the pretended patriarch of Jerusalem for the archiepiscopal see of Polock, returned afterwards to the unity

* De Eccl. Mil. iv. c. viii.

of the Church. Whether it was to escape the penalties he had incurred as one of the principal instigators, direct or indirect, of the murder of the Blessed Josaphat, the legitimate Archbishop of the same see, or for any other unknown reason, Smotricki had fled to Greece. There he found the Church in the greatest confusion and disorder: this sad spectacle made a happy impression on his mind; he resolved to abandon the schism, and even set about writing a book in favour of the union. He was betrayed by a false friend, and cited before a schismatic synod of Kief, where he had the weakness to recant, and to tear up his book with his own hands. But grace soon regained its supremacy; he went to Rome, was absolved by the Pope, and returned into Lithuania with the title of a Bishop *in partibus*, because he could not be placed on the see of Polock, which was occupied by the legitimate successor of the Blessed Josaphat. He persevered till the end of his life in the unity of the Church, and at his death there happened prodigies, recorded by Viak.

Now neither the Pope, nor the Catholic Bishops of Lithuania, nor Smotricki himself, ever showed the least doubt about the validity of his consecration. Indeed, a layman wrote to the Bishop *in partibus* to beg him to be re-consecrated; but Smotricki took good care not to comply with the invitation.

Here is another fact. In the beginning of the eighteenth century, Innocent, schismatic Bishop of Vinnitzy, demanded to be received with his whole flock into the communion of the Holy See. Innocent was looked upon at Rome as a relapsed heretic. The papal nuncio in Poland was also against him, and Mgr. Malacoski, the uniate Bishop of Vinnitzy, was his open enemy. The demand of Innocent was generally considered as a trap. People said, when he is sole Bishop of Vinnitzy, he will once more abandon the union, and will take with him, not only his old flock, but a great number of Catholics also. There is nothing to gain, much to lose, by his admission into the Church.

The king of Poland was of a different opinion. He deputed his confessor, the Piedmontese Jesuit Vota, to go to Rome, and to treat with the Pope. Innocent XII. referred him to the Congregation of the Propaganda, which was infected with all the prejudices current in Poland against Bishop Innocent. At a meeting of the Congregation, under the presidency of Cardinal Altieri, Cardinal Casanatta spoke with great power against the admission of Bishop Innocent. His chief object was to prove that the Bishop was not in good faith. But when it was Vota's turn to speak, he answered the Cardinal with such success, that the admission of the Bishop of Vinnitzy

was unanimously decided upon. In consequence, Malacoski was transferred to the see of Chelm, to make room for Innocent, who afterwards showed so much zeal and devotedness for the union, that by his means the Archbishop of Lemberg and the Bishop of Luck were induced to renounce the schism.

Here, then, are three Bishops whose orders are derived from Theophanes, or Theophilus. They were received, not without difficulty, into the communion of the Roman Church. The cause was discussed, examined on all sides, in the presence of ardent, numerous, and powerful enemies; and the only argument which was not produced was that which, if producible, would have been decisive, but which no one either in Poland or Rome thought of, namely, the invalidity of their ordinations.

After such plain facts, to attack the validity of the Russian orders looks like attacking the Holy See itself; it throws a doubt over the orders of the uniate Bishops of Galicia, and in particular over those of Mgr. Lewicki, Archbishop of Lemberg, Cardinal of the holy Roman Church, and successor of the former schismatical Bishops. There are plenty of good arguments to prove to the Russians that their ecclesiastical position is not regular, without being obliged to use weapons which wound the hand that wields them.

The case of the Anglican orders is very different. In the first place, the Holy See, which has shown itself so circumspect in its dealings with the orders of Utrecht and Kief, in spite of the prejudices of the Catholics of the Low Countries and of Poland, and has thereby proved that she would never deny the validity of the ordinations of heretics merely from a spite against their persons,—the Holy See has from the first treated the Anglican orders as nullities. The same respect that would teach us to refrain from questioning the episcopal character of Cardinal Lewicki would make us refrain from acknowledging such a character in Archbishop Sumner or Bishop Wilberforce.

But as we may be speaking to some with whom respect for the Holy See is not a decisive argument, we must enter into the particulars of the case, and show that the Anglican orders are historically in the highest degree doubtful; so doubtful, that no one who values his salvation and believes that to obtain it he must have valid sacraments, can be finally satisfied with the security they promise, even though he may be prepared to die in schism. Let us begin with the two old objections discussed by Courayer. "The first regarding Barlow, Parker's consecrator; the other, the form he used in the

ceremony of their ordination. It is pretended that Barlow was not consecrated himself, and that the rite of which he made use is entirely insufficient to insure the validity of ordination. Either the one or the other of these facts would be sufficient of itself to annihilate the English hierarchy."*

The third point shall be, the intention with which the first Elizabethan Bishops were made, as judged not so much from the known opinions of themselves, as from the meaning attached to the word 'bishop,' and to the functions he was to exercise, by the English Protestants of the period. There are Bishops and Bishops. The Catholic Bishop is the *summus sacerdos*, the centre and fount of sacramental power for his diocese; he is the chief sacrificer, as well as the governor of his flock. The Lutheran Bishop, on the other hand, is a mere superintendent, not the source of the power of the clergy, but only their governor and head. Is the Anglican Bishop,—or rather, was he in the minds of the Protestants of Elizabeth's days,—more like the Catholic or the Lutheran type? Was he the *summus sacerdos*, or only the minister who was made a royal commissioner, to look after the morals and conduct of the other ministers of his charge? Was his highest function to sacrifice or to preach? Is it not true to say of the Anglican Church and her episcopate, *Nomen callide retinuit; rem ipsam definiendo sustulit*,—she cunningly retained the name; the thing itself she totally destroyed by her definitions?

The fourth point is, to inquire into the probability of the nullity of the baptism of several of the Anglican hierarchy, who, if they were not Christians, evidently could not be Christian Bishops.

Was Barlow, the consecrator of Parker, ever consecrated himself? There are the gravest doubts on the subject. He was elected Bishop of St. Asaph, January 16th, 1536. The king's commission for his consecration was dated Feb. 22d, 1536,† and directed to Cranmer. Did Cranmer act upon it; or did both he and Barlow consider that the king's commission was to all intents and purposes a valid consecration, nay, that it would please the king to treat it as such, omitting all further ceremonies? In the first place, there is no direct testimony of Cranmer's having proceeded to consecrate Barlow, or directed a commission to other Bishops for his consecration. The Lambeth register, which contains all the other documents relating to Barlow,—his election, confirmation, &c.,—is quite silent about his consecration; and though Godwin‡ positively says, that "William Barlow, prior of the Canons-

* Courayer, Dissertation, chap. iii.

† Rymer, vol. xiv. p. 559.

‡ De Præsul. Ang. p. 663.

regular of Bisham, was consecrated Feb. 22d, 1535(6)," this is impossible, as we shall afterwards show; and no other author attempts to fix the date of this act. Cranmer acted at once on the royal commission of Feb. 22d,—not, however, to consecrate, but only to confirm,—and this by proxy, for Barlow was in Scotland. The consecration, says Courayer (cap. iii.), cannot have been delayed long after, both because the law (25 Hen. VIII. cap. 20, § 7) fixed the limit of twenty days after the king's letters-patent to "consecrate" the Bishop-elect under pain of *præmunire*, and also because there is proof that Barlow was already consecrated by the following April. He adds, that Strype does not hesitate to place Barlow's consecration in 1535(6). These reasons of Courayer are all ill-founded. Strype's unhesitating decision is a mere assumption of a man who had no more information than we have. As to the proof that Barlow was consecrated by April 1536, the proof is all the other way, as we shall soon have to show. And the law which prescribed to the Archbishop the duty of confirming, investing, and consecrating the prelate-elect was duly fulfilled, so far at least as to avoid the penalty, by one of the acts. The pains were threatened if the Archbishop "shall refuse, and do not *confirm, invest,** and consecrate, with all due circumstance within twenty days." These three acts are portions of one whole and single act; and if this act were commenced within the twenty days, the law was satisfied. Thus Bonner was elected and confirmed Bishop of Hereford in October 1538,† but not consecrated; in October 1539, he is translated to London, and in April 1540, and not before, he is consecrated Bishop of London,‡ having remained Bishop of Hereford a year, and Bishop of London half a year, without consecration. Therefore the law 25 Henry VIII. does not even suffice for a presumption that Barlow was consecrated as well as confirmed within twenty days after Feb. 22d, 1536.

Next, with respect to Courayer's assertion, that there is proof of Barlow's being consecrated before April 1536, it is so far from being true, that the direct contrary is demonstrable. We must return to Barlow's history. January 16, 1536, he was elected to the see of St. Asaph. February 18, the same year, Richard Rawlins, Bishop of St. David's, died; before news of this had reached court, the mandate of February 22d had been issued, and Barlow had been confirmed by proxy as Bishop of St. Asaph; two months afterwards he

* These two words are omitted in Courayer's quotation of the act; the insertion of them would have deprived his argument of its whole force.

† Cran. Regis. 218.

‡ Ibid. 211.

was transferred to the see of St. David's, the temporalities of which were restored to him by the king's letters, dated April 26th, 1536.* Now we affirm (1), that it is plain, from the public records relating to his successor at St. Asaph, that Barlow was not consecrated as Bishop of that see. And (2) that it is plain, from all the documents relating to his election, confirmation, &c. at St. David's, that he was treated as if he had been a consecrated Bishop *before* his election to that see. And our explanation of this curious fact is, that Cranmer and Barlow, both of whom mocked at the "apostolic succession," conspired to shirk the ceremony of consecration, not without an idea of flattering the king, whose theological acumen had just discovered that he was the sole source and channel of episcopal grace and power.

Barlow was not consecrated before his removal to St. David's, as may be gathered from the *congé-d'élire*, or license to the Dean and Chapter of St. Asaph to elect his successor. These *congés* always specify the cause of the vacancy; if the former Bishop is dead, they run, *vacante per mortem naturalem ultimi Episcopi*; if he is translated to another see, *per translationem ultimi Episcopi*; if deprived, *per deprivationem ultimi Episcopi*: and whenever the Bishop mentioned was only elected and confirmed, and not consecrated, he is always, we believe without exception, in all formal documents called *Bishop-elect* only. Now in the *congé-d'élire* to the Dean and Chapter of St. Asaph to elect Barlow's successor, Barlow is called *Bishop-elect*, and the cause of the vacancy is said to be his *exchange*: *vacante sede per liberam transmutationem Wilhelmi Barlow ultimi Episcopi electi*; and so he is described in all the formal documents relating to the history of his successor. There is no other instance in which a translation is described by any other word than *translationem*,† nor in which

* Mason de Ministerio Anglicano, lib. iii. cap. x. p. 365.

† The invariable form used when the translated Bishop has been consecrated before his translation is, "Vacante per translationem dni A.B. ultimi Episcopi ibidem." In the documents of Barlow's successor at St. Asaph's, the cause of vacancy is several times expressed, but never in this mode. In the letters-patent (Cran. Reg. 194a), it is "per liberam transmutationem," &c., as in the text; in the petition (ib. 194b), "per cessionem, dimissionem sive transmutationem reverendi patris dni Willmi Barlowe ultimi Episcopi electi ibidem." In the instrument of assent (ib. 195b), "per liberam dimissionem, cessionem et transmutationem reverendi patris dni Willmi Barlowe, ultimi Epi ibm electi." In the process of election (ib. 195b), "per liberam renunciationem, cessionem sive transmutationem reverendi patris dni Willmi Barlow ultimi et immediati Episcopi ibidem in eandem ecclesiam Cath. Assaphen. electi." In the same (196a), "per transmutationem, cessionem sive liberam dimissionem reverendi patris Willmi Barlowe ultimi presulis sive pastoris electi." In the same (196b), "per liberam renunciationem, cessionem, dimissionem et transmutationem dni Willmi Barlowe ultimi et immediati presulis et pastoris et Epi ejusdem electi." In the final sentence (ib. 197b), "per liberam transmutationem dni Willmi, Barlowe

a consecrated Bishop is called only *Bishop-elect*. The clear meaning of these expressions is, that in consequence of the bishopric of St. David's falling vacant before Barlow was consecrated to St. Asaph, the "Bishop-elect" was not "translated," but "freely exchanged" to St. David's.

To this argument Courayer replies (chap. iv.) by producing a case which he calls "altogether parallel with that of Barlow," where a consecrated Bishop is called *Bishop-elect*.

"In the year 1633, after the death of Godwin of Hereford, Juxon had been chosen to succeed him in that see. Before he was consecrated and installed, he was translated to London. He was confirmed in this new see, Oct. 23, 1633, and consecrated, Oct. 27. Lyndsell of Peterborough succeeded him in Hereford, March 7, 1634. The king consented to Lyndsell's election, March 21, 1634; and on the 24th he was confirmed by Archbishop Laud. Now, in the acts of election and confirmation of Lyndsell, Juxon, though consecrated and confirmed in the see of London, is all along styled Bishop-elect of Hereford. . . . Cum sedes Herefordiensis tam per mortem naturalem Francisci Godwin nuper episcopi ibidem, ac per promotionem Willmi Juxon in episcopum ibidem electi ad episcopatum Londiniensem, nuper vacaverit, &c. Should we have any right to conclude from these words, that Juxon was not at that time consecrated, when we have the record of his consecration prior by four months?"

We reply, that we have the right to conclude, from the words, "Bishop-elect of Hereford," that Juxon was never consecrated to the see of Hereford; and this conclusion is historically correct. His consecration, after his removal from Hereford to London, could not possibly make him the consecrated Bishop of Hereford. He never had been more than Bishop-elect of that see; and so he is called in these acts, which, in treating of Hereford, have no occasion to meddle with London. In the same way, we conclude that as Barlow, after his removal to St. David's, is called "late Bishop-elect of St. Asaph's," he was never consecrated while he had possession of the see of St. Asaph's.

But the case does not stand on mere verbal criticism. Barlow *could* not have been consecrated to the see of St. Asaph; because he was absent in Scotland during the whole time of his holding that see. The mandate for his consecration was issued February 22; it was confirmed by proxy the next day (Cran. Register); therefore he was not present. A letter of his is extant, written from Scotland in March the same

ultimi Epi ibm electi et confirmati." Not a word about his consecration; but a studious avoidance of the word, and of all other expressions generally used for consecrated prelates.

year, whither "the Bishop-elect of St. Asaph" had been sent with Lord William Howard, by Henry VIII., to induce James V. to throw off the Pope's authority. This letter is signed "Will'm Barlow," though he was then confirmed in his see. He was elected to the see of St. David's, April 10th; and on the 21st was confirmed in person at Bow church: the record is perfect; but there is no mention of consecration. After this he departed for Scotland again, and was there by May 13, when he signs his letters "Will'mus Menev.," as if he had been consecrated Bishop of St. David's: no mandate for his consecration to this see appears either in the Rolls or in the register at Lambeth, but merely the royal assent, which simply commands the Archbishop, *ut quod vestrum est in hac parte exequamini*. The king, we suppose, was privy to the fraud; and accordingly the record of Barlow's confirmation to the sees, both of St. Asaph and St. David's, is closed with a certificate from the Archbishop to the king of his confirmation only; proving that he was not then consecrated. Further, he was called to Parliament by a writ of summons, April 27, 1536, in which he is named, according to Courayer, not Bishop-elect, but Bishop, as though consecrated; and yet, when he took his seat in the House of Lords, June 30, 1536, he took precedence (according to the Lords' journals) *after* Reppis of Norwich, who was consecrated June 11, 1536. For this reason his consecration is assumed to be *after* that date by the late Anglican editor of Bramhall's works. Yet the man must have sat somewhere. If he was summoned to Parliament without consecration, we cannot see why he may not have sat there without it too.

Barlow, then, was not consecrated to the see of St. Asaph, as Courayer says he must have been. Was he, then, consecrated after his "transmutation" to St. David's? In the register, all the documents about this affair are perfect; but there is no record of his consecration. On the contrary, throughout these documents, even in the royal assent, which commands Cranmer "to do what to him pertaineth," Barlow is described as "late Bishop of St. Asaph," and never called "Bishop-elect;" that is, he is assumed to be a consecrated Bishop; and as such he is elected and confirmed in his new see without any thought of consecration. The register may be searched equally in vain for any record of his consecration on his removal to the see of Bath and Wells, in 1548. Indeed, it would be preposterous to expect that a man who had once passed himself off for a consecrated Bishop, would ever be likely afterwards to incur the danger of confessing that he had never received the rite.

We suppose, then, to use Courayer's words (chap. iv.), that there was a collusion or conspiracy between Cranmer and Barlow to omit the ceremony of consecration. "As these two prelates were of very Presbyterian sentiments, and did not acknowledge the necessity of consecration, nor the efficacy of the sacrament of orders, it is very possible that Cranmer,—who knew Barlow's sentiments with respect to the inutility and inefficacy of ordination, and his aversion to the ceremonies of the Pontifical, and who, moreover, was of the same opinion himself,—might, in concert with Barlow, have given him letters of institution and installation, by means of which he was invested with his bishopric."

Courayer owns this conjecture to be very ingenious, and to have all the force a conjecture can have. But he objects, that the omission of consecration is not very possible. It was not an affair between Cranmer and Barlow alone; three Bishops at least were required at the consecration; and certificates of consecration had to be shown before investiture could be had. In a matter so impossible to be concealed, Cranmer and Barlow would rather have swallowed the whole Pontifical than have subjected themselves to the *præmunire*, by omitting the consecration. In this part of his answer, Courayer quite forgets the opportunity for collusion and jugglery which the translation of Barlow afforded; and we have produced documentary evidence that seems to show that Cranmer and Barlow profited by the occasion. In records that would come under the eyes of the chapter of St. Asaph, who knew that Barlow was unconsecrated, he was always called "Bishop-elect." But he was palmed off on the chapter of St. David's as consecrated. It was a case in which suspicion might easily fail to be excited; and the chapter, when it received documents signed by the Archbishop, which treated Barlow as consecrated, would be very unlikely to demand proofs of the act, especially in the case of the translation of a Bishop, whom they would naturally presume to have been consecrated to his former see.

There was, then, an opportunity for such a collusion. But, says Courayer, Henry VIII. was very strict, and an enemy to innovators. Was it an easy thing to impose upon him? We answer, that there was no need of concealment or imposition with regard to the king. On the contrary, we believe that the whole affair was intended as a delicate piece of flattery to the head of the Anglican Church. We know, by a document which we shall quote directly, that in 1540 a notable theological idea had taken possession of the monarch's head; namely, that the power of consecrating Bishops was given

provisionally to the Apostles and their successors, to last only till they had a Christian king among them, to whom the power was eventually to belong. What more acceptable compliment, than to come to a king in this frame of mind, and tell him that Barlow considered himself validly consecrated by his highness's commission, and to beseech him that in this case all superfluous ceremonies might be omitted? And what more likely tool for such an act of sycophancy than the willing pander of all Henry's adulteries; the man who married him to Anne Boleyn before he had pronounced Catherine's divorce; the man who was always ready in marriage or divorce to bend all laws to Henry's will,—Cranmer? Or what more likely conspirator in the fraud than Barlow, the apostate monk, who had "buried the Mass" in 1519, written against the marriage of priests in 1531, recanted his grievous errors of denying the Mass and Purgatory, and slandering the Pope, in 1533; who became a creature of Anne Boleyn the next year, and by her means was made rector of Sundridge, prior of Haverfordwest, and prior of Bisham; who was sent ambassador to Scotland to promote schism, and preach the Gospel, in 1536; who united with Cranmer in opposing the Six Articles in 1539, and in assenting to them when passed; in denying the Sacraments, and recognising the king as the fountain of orders, in 1540; who was employed in composing almost every heretical document of importance during the reigns of Henry and Edward, and in translating part of the Apocrypha for Parker's Bible; who wasted the property of the see of St. David's, and utterly ruined that of Bath and Wells; and who married within a few years of his publishing his dialogue against the marriage of the clergy;—a man, in short, whose whole history shows him to have been an unprincipled scoundrel?

But, urges Courayer, it could not have been concealed from the Church. This is just what we contend it could have been by the opportunity of collusion afforded by the "transmutation" from St. Asaph to St. David's. The rite, though always performed almost privately, was never questioned, never doubted. The occasion of omitting it was convenient; it only remains to prove that Henry VIII., Cranmer, and Barlow were in the mind to take advantage of the opportunity.

In 1540, Henry, who was always inventing new dogmas, put certain questions to the Bishops and other divines, which, with the answers, may be seen in Burnet's *History of the Reformation*, vol. i. p. 201. Amongst them are the following questions, with the answers of Cranmer and Barlow:

Question. "Whether the Apostles, *lacking a higher power, as in not having a Christian king among them*, made Bishops by that necessity, or by authority given of God?"

Cranmer. "The civil ministers under the king be lord chancellor, lord treasurer, admirals, sheriffs, &c. The ministers of God's word, under his majesty, be Bishops, parsons, vicars, and such other priests as be appointed by his highness to that ministration; as, for example, the Bishop of Canterbury, the Bishop of Durham, the parson of Winwick, &c.; all the said offices be appointed, assigned, and elected in every place by the laws and orders of kings and princes. In the admission of these offices be divers comely ceremonies and solemnities, and which be not of necessity, but only for a good order and seemly fashion; for if *such offices and ministrations were committed without such solemnity, they were nevertheless duly committed*; and there is no more promise of God that grace is given in the committing of the ecclesiastical office, than it is in the committing of the civil office."

Barlow. "Because they lacked a Christian prince; by that necessity they ordained other bishops" [*i. e.* to the prince properly belongs the power of ordaining, which was only lent to the Apostles till the lack of a prince was supplied].

Question. "Whether Bishops or priests were first; and if the priest were first, then the priest made the Bishop?"

Cranmer. "The Bishops and priests were at one time, and were not two things, but both one office at the beginning of Christ's religion."

Barlow. "At the beginning they were all one."

Question. "Whether in the New Testament *be required any consecration* of a Bishop or priest, or only appointing to the office be sufficient?"

Cranmer. "In the New Testament he that is appointed to be a Bishop or a priest *needeth no consecration* by the Scripture; *for election or appointing thereunto is sufficient.*"

Barlow. "Only the appointing."

Besides these answers, we read of articles being exhibited against Barlow in November 1536, seven months after his removal to St. David's, for having preached, "If the king's grace, being supreme head of the Church of England, did choose, denominate, and elect any layman, being learned, to be a Bishop, that he so chosen, without mention made of any orders, should be as good a Bishop as he is, or the best in England."* Courayer preposterously asks, "Does not this proposition, be it never so heretical, prove evidently that he had been consecrated himself?" Persons reduced to such "evidence" must be very doubtful of their cause.

* Strype's *Memorials*, vol. i. Appendix, p. 287, and Collier's *Eccles. Hist.* vol. ii. p. 135.

We have proved the opportunity, and the will of the three parties concerned; this alone furnishes a ground for thinking the omission probable. There is no register whatever of the performance of the act of consecration; on the contrary, the registers speak of Barlow as having left St. Asaph's unconsecrated, and imply that he came to St. David's consecrated. Now, as he could not have been consecrated while he had no see,—indeed, as he only left one see to go to the other, as he was called “Bishop of St. David's” at the same moment that he ceased to be “Bishop-elect of St. Asaph,” and therefore had no time to be consecrated during his transmutation,—we seem to have the clearest documentary evidence possible under the circumstances that he was never consecrated at all.

To recapitulate: considering the openly expressed opinions of both Cranmer and Barlow, that consecration was not necessary; that as this opinion was pleasing to the king, so it would not offend him to act upon it; that there was a most convenient opportunity of acting upon it; that there is no record of any consecration of Barlow by Cranmer, or any one commissioned by him, or by any one at all; that the documents relating to Barlow's successor at St. Asaph speak of him as having been “Bishop-elect” only, that is, unconsecrated, and use words to describe the cause of the vacancy, which are studiously varied from those which describe the translation of a true Bishop; considering too, that the documents relating to his induction to St. David's tacitly assume without asserting that he was already consecrated, though it is notoriously impossible that he could have undergone this rite *in transitu* from St. Asaph's to St. David's; considering also that it was a time of revolution in Church and State, the king grasping at absolute power in both, the Bishops and higher clergy infected with the new heresies, and the people bewildered with constant changes in religion, so that nothing was stable, and no man despaired of introducing any novelty,—it becomes utterly improbable that Barlow was ever consecrated at all; such considerable doubts are thrown on the point as to be equivalent to an entire denial of it; and, in the words of Courayer, the English ordinations are “ruined past all remedy.” For where salvation is at stake, who would put up with such an utter uncertainty when he can have an infallible certainty?

It is utterly irrelevant to object that Barlow was summoned by writs to Parliament, and sat in convocation like a consecrated prelate; or even that, on the 19th of February 1541-42, he, with the Bishop of Gloucester, assisted the Bishop of Salisbury in consecrating Bulkeley. Of course he did;

believing himself to be as good a Bishop as any one else, and having succeeded in palming himself off upon the world as a properly consecrated Bishop, we cannot be surprised either at finding him acting as such, or at seeing the world looking on unsurprised. Nor is the negative argument, which Courayer supposes to be "of no less force than the rest," of any weight; for it is not true. "Is there," he says, "one author found who during more than seventy years accused him of usurping the episcopate without consecration?" In those dangerous times, we must not expect to find all the suspicions of Catholics written out at length and published; but in matter of fact misgivings of the power of Barlow, Scory, and Coverdale to consecrate Parker and the rest did exist, as may be seen by the words of the commission by virtue of which the consecration was performed. This commission contained the following clause, quite unheard of before :

"Supplying nevertheless by our supreme authority, if there is or shall be wanting for the performance of the premises any of those things which, by the statutes of this realm, or by the laws of the Church, are required, or are necessary to that effect, either in those persons who are to be consecrated by you according to our command aforesaid, or in you or any of you, *in consequence of your condition, state, or faculties*. This being required by the necessity of the times and the urgency of the matters."

There was a doubt, then, and a public and urgent doubt too, about the *condition, state, and faculties* of the Bishops who were required to consecrate: and this doubt was not discussed according to the canons, but in consequence of the "necessities of the times" stifled by a royal writ; as Sanders says, "being therefore destitute of any legitimate ordination, when they were commonly said, and by the English laws themselves were truly proved not to be Bishops, they were obliged to invoke the secular arm" to confirm them in an office they had usurped "without any episcopal consecration."* What more natural than that Barlow, conscious of his own want of the episcopal character, but believing that "a Christian prince" had the apostolic power of raising men to that dignity, should seek such a proviso from the queen? especially considering there was a question whether the royal dispensations did not cease with the life of the prince, and require renewal in a new reign. Thus Archbishop Parker, anno 1569, in the case of marriage dispensations, though he would by no means dispute the queen's absolute power or papal jurisdiction, yet thought dispensations unsafe, because though during the

* Sanders de Schism. lib. ii. (ed. 1585), fol. 166.

prince's life such grants might be covered from dispute, yet another reign might call for retrospection.*

This doubt of the consecration of Barlow, Parker's consecrator, is, as Courayer owns, sufficient in itself to annihilate the English hierarchy. But English divines have attempted to find a loophole by affirming that Barlow's assistants at that ceremony, being real Bishops, consecrated him. But this objection comes with a very ill grace from those who altered the old rubric, and forbade the assistants to pronounce the words of consecration. The consecration comes from the consecrator, not from the assistants; they present the consecrand to the Archbishop, or his commissary, saying, "Most Reverend Father in God, we present unto *you* this godly and well learned man to be consecrated Bishop;" and then, as the rubric directs, "the Archbishop and Bishops present shall lay their hands upon the head of the elected Bishop, *the Archbishop saying*, 'Take the Holy Ghost; and remember that thou stir up the grace of God which is in thee by imposition of hands,' &c." Parker's consecration was conducted according to this form; yet we read, Barlow, Scory, Hodgkins, and Coverdale imposed their hands on the Archbishop, and said, "Take the Holy Ghost," &c.—"*Accipe (dixerunt Anglice) Spiritum Sanctum.*" How is this? The rubric is clear that the consecrating prelate alone pronounces the words of consecration, the assistants laying their hands on the Bishop-elect, and saying nothing. Barlow had helped to frame this rubric, which altered the old practice.† If there had been an intended and predetermined departure from this innovation, it would have been noticed distinctly, and not in so accidental a manner as this, of which it is impossible to determine whether it is not only a slip of the pen. There is no proof that the writer adverted to the fact that the *dixerunt* was a departure from the rubric, and as such to be noted by some little explanation of the cause, or other emphasis. Such a note being absent, it is much easier to believe that there was some oversight of the reporter than a transgression of the rubrics of the service which was being performed. But as all sacraments consist *in rebus et verbis*, as St. Thomas says,‡ both in symbol and words, he who only uses the symbol without pronouncing the words cannot be said to confer the

* Collier, Eccl. Hist. part ii. lib. vi. anno 1569.

† *Why* this alteration was made we cannot pretend to explain. Possibly they thought that so many pronouncing the same words at once was "mumbling" or "mummery;" at any rate, the alteration proved that they did not intend the assistant Bishops to be in any sense consecrators. The clear intention of the rubric is that the Archbishop *alone* consecrates.

‡ Sum. supp. ix. 35, art. v. sed contra.

Sacrament. And this was the case of the assistant Bishops, if they obeyed the prescriptions of the form which they professed to follow,—which we must suppose they did in spite of the plural verb used by the notary.

But even if they did all utter the words when they laid their hands on Parker, they did no more than the assisting Bishops at the consecration of a Catholic Bishop: yet we do not own that these Bishops do in any sense consecrate; but we say that they assist as witnesses, and to signify their assent, in the same way as the priests present impose their hands with the Bishop at the ordination of priests. That this was the intention of the Church in directing the presence of the assistant Bishops, is evident from the fact that they may in special cases be replaced by priests, as in the case of Pope Pelagius I., mentioned above. We have inquired of Bishops who have been assistants, who have told us that they never intended to confer the Sacrament, but left that to the consecrator. The Catholic Church, therefore, will never recognise English orders, even though it could be proved that all Barlow's assistants at Parker's consecration were real Bishops, and that they all pronounced the words.

But can this be proved? With regard to the consecrations of Scory and Coverdale, they are represented in Cranmer's Register to have been performed on *the same day* (Aug. 30, 1551), and by the same prelates, Cranmer, Ridley, and Hodgkins; but at two places,* twelve miles apart—Scory's at Croydon, Coverdale's at Lambeth. Moreover they are attested by the same witnesses (one of the four being absent in Coverdale's case), and a sermon on the same text preached at both. Farther, on examining the certificate of the consecration which occurs in the Register next before those of Scory and Coverdale, namely Hooper's, it appears that Scory's is an exact copy of it down to the parties present, the person reading the mandate, the text of the sermon, and the mistakes in the spelling.

The records of the consecrations of Scory and Coverdale are so suspicious, that we may almost pronounce them to be forgeries; at any rate, they either are falsified, or else so carelessly drawn up that there is no reason to trust them; the credit of the notaries who drew them up, and the witnesses who signed them, is irreparably damaged;—and among these are Anthony Huse, the registrar, and John Incent, one of the notaries, both of whom drew up or signed what pur-

* It cannot be said that the difference of places is a mere oversight, for the place at which either Scory or Coverdale's consecration took place (we forget which) is written over an erasure.

ports to be the account of Parker's consecration, and on whose authority the word *dixerunt* rests.

It is besides very easy to account for the plural verb without any supposition of fraud. These notarial accounts are evidently drawn up after a fixed form. Now when the service of consecration was changed in 1550, the register was made much more brief; but the old diffuse method was restored in the first year of Elizabeth. Huse, the registrar, who had filled the same office in Catholic times, would naturally follow the old form of describing the ceremony as nearly as might be, just introducing the necessary alterations. Now in the Catholic service *all* the Bishops not only lay hands on the head of the consecrand, but also pronounce the words; the form, therefore, would be "*Accipe, dixerunt, Spiritum Sanctum.*"* By a mistake, this form might be allowed to remain in the registers, though the service itself had been altered. The Bishops themselves had altered the rubric, and therefore certainly altered the old practice. The registrar did not know, or did not happen to observe, the change, and so recorded the act in the same words as he had always been accustomed to record it; that is to say, the use of the word *dixerunt* in the register proves nothing against the rubric; and neither Scory, Coverdale, nor Hodgkins (who was a true Bishop, consecrated by Bonner in St. Paul's, Dec. 9, 1537), can be shown to have attempted to confer the Sacrament by using the full ceremonies, that is, by pronouncing the words as well as imposing the hands. It is noticeable, that the registrar in the same way makes *all* the Bishops also pronounce the long sermon, "Give heed unto thy reading," &c.,—a thing very unlikely. It is also to be noticed, that this form of registration is afterwards changed, and brought into conformity with the rubrics.

Our investigation of the question whether Barlow was ever consecrated has extended to such a length, that we must resume our discussion of the other points on a future occasion. These points are, the validity and legality of the form used; the intention of the reformed Church of England in instituting Bishops—whether, that is, it was intended to make Catholic Bishops, or ministerial overseers; and the probability of the want of baptism in many Bishops through whom these same orders have been handed down.

* The rubric in the Pontifical is, "*Deinde consecrator et assistentes Episcopi ambabus manibus caput consecrandi tangent, dicentes, 'Accipe Spiritum Sanctum.'*"

MUSICAL HUMOURS.

"I HAVE a reasonable good ear in music," says Bottom;* "let's have the tongs and bones." To whatever barbarisms a "reasonable good ear" may lead a man, we doubt whether by itself it would ever lead him to prefer the "plain-song" of the old Doric, Lydian, and other modes, or their mediæval representatives, to the rich developments of modern music. There is something jovial and bacchanalian in tongs and bones, which may influence a man's choice; but the plain-song can scarcely be liked for itself, apart from other motives. We agree, therefore, with ancient Pistol, who says,

"The plain-song is most just; for humours do abound."

What are, then, these humours, which make people pronounce plain-song to be, not most beautiful or most expressive, but most *just*, and therefore to be adopted not for love but for duty?

We will pass over that let-me-play-the-lion-too humour of Bottom which rules a section of the musical world; which makes a great athletic brute, whom Nature only meant to bellow bass, aggravate his voice so as to roar like a sucking dove, or sing small like a woman; or a woman naturally gifted with the richest contralto crack her voice in attempts to occupy the place of first treble; and which in church, too, may possibly make some people open their mouths, not because they can sing, but because they cannot be silent, and may therefore make them demand a music suited to the capacities of persons who sing a little, but do not know whether they are in tune or no. None of the advocates of plain-song with whom we have to do are chargeable with this humour.

But there are three very prevalent humours, which have a great deal to do with the affirmation of the proposition, "the plain-song is most just." These are, ecclesiastical misogynism, Gothic puritanism, and theological owlshness.

The ecclesiastical misogynist declares that it is an abomination to let a woman's voice be heard in church; he might prove his point by the following story of St. Bernard. In the cathedral of Spire stands a famous image of the Blessed Virgin; St. Bernard, who was preaching the crusade in the town, came one day to hear Mass in the cathedral. He was very unpunctual; nevertheless, as he hurried up the nave, he

* *Midsummer-Night's Dream.*

did not forget to kneel before the image, which, to his surprise, addressed him with the words:

“ O Bernarde,
Cur tam tarde,”—

“ O Bernard, why so late?” St. Bernard, as a theologian, knew he had the best of the argument, and retorted, “ *Mulier taceat in ecclesiâ*,”—“ A woman must not speak in church.” And the image has never spoken a word since. So women must not sing in church. What are we to do for trebles, then? says the choir-master. Boys, is the answer. But they are always out of tune. Without women to support them, they spoil all concerted music. Then you must recur to plain-song, according to the command given in similar circumstances by Peter the showman in *Don Quixote* to his boy: “ Don’t run so much upon flourishes; but follow your plain-song, without venturing upon counterpoints, for fear of spoiling all.”

The next humour is the puritanism of Gothic art. For Gothic architecture itself we have the highest admiration; and we pity the man who can stand unmoved under the vaults of Milan, Cologne, or Amiens. But we do not see what these glorious creations have in common with the things too often palmed off upon us: we see no authority in them for the gloom and inconvenience which English Goths have erected into principles of the art. The able author of a little pamphlet lately published in Dublin says to these gentlemen with much truth,

“ You have conquered England, and imprisoned the English. Under an able leader in his day, a very Mahomet for fanatic zeal, you have raised cathedrals and mission churches, dark as Erebus, gloomy as Acheron. You have walled up poor nuns in such *oubliettes* as might well make Mr. Spooner’s blood run cold when he passes their outer precincts. You have incarcerated no small number of the secular clergy in England, together with some communities of regulars, not to mention a Bishop or two, in dungeons terrible to the imagination. They enter these receptacles of suffering humanity at an angle of forty-five degrees, through narrow wickets, studded with ponderous nails, strengthened with massive iron, guarded by clashing bolts and chains, as though to defend the presbyteries of Fathers Smith and Jones from the inroads of some baronial neighbour, or the descent of Norman pirates from their galleys. Grim gurgoyles gnash at them as they pass; they live amid an assemblage of ‘gorgons, hydras, and chimeras dire!’ The very images of the Saints—but I fear to grow irreverent by describing them with fidelity. Enough. You have surrounded the English clergy with an atmosphere of gloom. Contemplate them, the dejected ones, as they

toil up their narrow incommodious stairs, as they peer forth from latticed loopholes, made on a type four centuries before the duty on crown-glass was removed. The 'dim religious light' takes place of the light of heaven. Bars and mullions scowl sashes and cheerfulness out of countenance. It is not permitted to walk two abreast; that is part of the prison regulations. We are slow to be convinced that a building must be gloomy in order to be religious; that nothing but a vault can suggest pious remembrances. For us, with our gloomy sky and dark remembrances, to be further darkened and be-gloomed in the very house of prayer!"*

We can easily see how plain-song agrees with gloom; though we cannot see why intricate counterpoint and strongly-coloured instrumentation are alien from the real spirit of the art which raised the gorgeous shrines of mediæval Christianity. Gothic architects teach that heaven is enlivened with orchestral music; at least they arm the hands of their stone angels with fiddles, harps, trumpets, guitars, and hautboys. In painted windows we have seen them thumping kettle-drums and tambourines. But perhaps these instruments, like women in churches, or children in drawing-rooms, are meant to be seen and not heard. Why not? When the Orientals objected to the use of organs in churches, they were settled with the text, "*Omnis spiritus laudet Dominum*,—Let every wind instrument praise the Lord." "*Laudate eum in chordis et organo*" includes a whole orchestra. Why, then, do our Goths bid them be silent in church? Years ago we read a pamphlet by a great architect, wherein he tells us that, as he was hearing Mass in Cologne cathedral, the beauties of which raised his mind to heaven, suddenly "those diabolical fiddles" struck up, and the beautiful vision faded away, and he found himself in a concert-room. Most men have not such powerful imaginations; they can trust their eyes against their ears. But our architect did not know this; he thought that what he felt others experienced also. He saw in his own case the superiority of music to architecture. Even the highest efforts of his own art faded from his mind beneath music's more potent spell. Did his own works fade in like manner from men's eyes under the same fascinating influence? The idea was terrible; there was nothing for it but to run a muck at "diabolical fiddles," "infernal trebles," and so on; and to substitute for them the monotonous drone of plain-song, which, instead of distracting the attention from the architecture, forces a man, for his own comfort, to distract his attention from the music.

The third humour, which pronounces the plain-song to be

* A Word to the Goths (Dublin, 1857), pp. 4, 6, 7.

most just, is that of theological owls; men who look very wise and deep, but are at the same time lovers rather of obscurity than of light. One will tell you that plain-song is part of the Incarnation. Another that it is a development of the doctrine of the Trinity. As a specimen of this shallow twaddle and sham-philosophy, worthy of Gnostics and conjurers, take the following, which, though not directly bearing upon plain-song, is a good specimen of what we mean. It is from an article on musical rhythm, which appeared some time last summer in the *Univers*:

“Musical times are three: binary, or common, representing force; trinary, or triple, representing grace; and the union of the two, representing force and grace united. These three accord with the sentiments of the soul; and the soul being created after the image of God, all her *movements* ought to have the characteristics of God Himself. Now God manifests Himself to us under three distinct forms: as Creator in might, as Redeemer in love, as Sanctifier in might and love united. Musical rhythm, then, is nothing but the image of God in Three Persons.

Madame Marie Bernard Gjertz recognises a rhythm of corruption, which also has its three distinct characteristics—infamy, effeminacy, pride; the rhythms of the Bacchante, of the vain coward, of the infidel philosopher. The first engenders license; the second imbecility; the third despair. All three lead to perdition; and yet one hears them often in church!

Beethoven is the chief of the school of pride. Before him Haydn and Mozart had developed the *sonata*, the most perfect of all forms, being that which attempts to reproduce the adorable lineaments of the Redeemer (!). Haydn's sonatas represent the pure and simple Christian soul, which has always loved and believed the good God without an idea of doubting or reasoning. Mozart, by the sentiment of melancholy impressed on almost all his works, exhibits a soul desiring what it ought not, but wherein faith, still living, gives birth to resignation. Obedient for duty's sake, not for love, she remains melancholy in her obedience.

Beethoven's music makes a man in love with despair; it weeps tears of blood, not for the agony of an incarnate God, but for the eternal ruin of the devil. This is the rhythm of pride, which seeks truth, and implores it, but will not receive it as it is revealed. It is always the Jew saying to the Saviour, Descend from the Cross, that we may believe in Thee. Obey our caprices, flatter our bad passions, and we will proclaim Thee to be the true God; . . . or else, *Crucifige!* Beethoven's works put Christ to death in our hearts, as the Jews put Him to death on the Cross!”

Last October M. Berlioz reproduced this article in the *Journal des Débats*, with a very slight commentary, the pith of which was, “What a pity that I am neither theologian nor

philosopher! I suppose, if I were, I should understand all this." Then he went on to say, that he had often been moved to tears by Beethoven's music; but he could swear, with his hand on his heart, that though they did not flow for the sufferings of an incarnate God, they were not shed over the eternal perdition of the devil, whose acquaintance he had cut for some time. Hereupon *M. Louis Veuillot*, who had certainly deserved all he got, and who had only himself to blame for provoking this sneer on religion, returned furiously to the charge; reasserted the doctrines of Madame Gjertz, and made certain additions of his own in the same spirit. "Theology and philosophy are necessary," he said, "to musicians. Palestrina was a theologian; it is impossible to hear one of his masses without being convinced that he was a deep dogmatic divine; certainly, for an intelligent listener, the Amen of the Credo of the mass of Pope Marcellus is as good as a lesson in theology." It is a great pity, then, say we, that Palestrina ever mixed up his divinity with such profane words as he did, and that he wrote madrigals and love-songs quite undistinguishable in style from his "dogmatic theology." "Haydn and Mozart," continues our prophet, "in that they were sincere Christians, were also, though in a less degree than Palestrina, theologians and philosophers. You may find in their lives, as well as in their music, the order, nobleness, gentleness, and purity so well described in the article which has amused *M. Berlioz*."* So we suppose Palestrina, Haydn, and Mozart, are the heavenly trinity of music; while Beethoven, with his disciple Berlioz, and other moderns, such as (say) Rossini and Auber, are the infernal triad—the devil, the world, and the flesh. This is what ultra-theorising brings us to! Before we dare to like a piece of music, we must inquire whose it is; and if it belongs to a condemned composer, we must pronounce it heretical! O *M. Veuillot*, what a droll thing is man, when he goes in his doublet and hose, and leaves off his wits!

But to be serious: though we have divided the Gregorianisers into three classes, of misogynists or woman-haters, Goths, and theological owls, we are neither so impudent nor so blind to facts as to assert that all lovers of plain-chant fall into these categories. In moderation, and in its proper place, the plain-chant, when well sung, is very magnificent. Almost every one, when the solemn Kyrie or the Requiem first bursts upon him, is obliged to confess that he has never heard any thing finer in his life. It is only when movement succeeds

* See the *Univers* for Oct. 31, 1857. We have abridged the article considerably; in its original state it is as tedious as it is foolish.

movement, without change or relief, that the monotony becomes intolerable, and the ear is absolutely pained by the infliction. A great deal of the melody is beautiful, especially that which is most in use; the man would indeed be a barbarian who on æsthetical grounds should think of suppressing or altering such gems as the chant of the Preface, the tones of the psalms, or the Lamentations. For all antiphonal service plain-chant is indispensable. It is only when it occurs in long movements, such as the Gloria or Credo, that it becomes so very unbearable; and here no expedients will mitigate the calamity. We have never heard the plain-song more effectively sung, or by a finer body of voices, than in the Norbertine Abbey of Tongerlo; yet even there the brother organist found it necessary to enliven it with interludes from the last new opera, or from Strauss's waltzes. Travellers know how universal this practice is. One of the most successful accompaniers of the plain-chant that ever we heard in England, tried to smother it with contrapuntal embroideries, leaving the chant itself as a *falso bordone*, so called, we suppose, from its resemblance to the *drone* of the bagpipes.

So the three classes of Gregorianisers allow of very wide exceptions. There may be excellent reasons for forbidding women's singing in particular churches. All the singing may be done in the chancel; or the church may belong to religious, who cannot consistently with their rule go up into a gallery and mix with female singers. But nothing can be a greater fallacy than to suppose that there is any thing revolting to ecclesiastical discipline in the fact itself of females singing during service. No one wants to put women into surplices, or introduce them into the chancel; the question is simply whether, in singing hymns, psalms, and those other parts of the Catholic rite where the congregation responds, women as well as men may join. Suppose the whole congregation sings, as in some parts of Germany, it would evidently be absurd to tell the women to be silent. But when we get out of the confines of the German song-land, we find the majority of the people condemned by nature to silence. Naturally, then, the singers that remain, finding it impossible to sing together unless they place themselves together, congregate in some particular spot. Gradually, as the proportion between singers and non-singers becomes more unequal, it is found necessary, in order to render the few remaining vocalists audible, to raise them above the heads of the rest of the people in some tribune by themselves. Hence the organ-galleries were enlarged for them; but even after this exaltation, they remain only what they were before, the deputies of the congregation for per-

forming a work which the whole congregation ought to perform if it can. We are not speaking of churches with real ecclesiastical choirs, such as monasteries, where the monks are sufficient, and ought to make all responses without the congregation; but of churches where the duty *must* be left to the congregation or its deputies. And we ask, Does any known ecclesiastical principle require that these deputies of the congregation should be rather of the male than the female sex? All the congregation have a right to sing if they can; else, if half of them are to be prevented on account of their sex, it must be for a reason which would make it unlawful for nuns themselves to sing in church,—an absurdity which no one would maintain in the face of the practice of the Catholic Church. In Rome, the *Trinità de' Monti* is quite a show church on account of the nuns' voices, which used to be so cultivated that Mendelssohn himself wrote a set of motetts for them. The faithful in conventual churches are properly represented by a select choir of nuns, and in seminary churches by a selection from the students: apply the same rule to common parochial congregations, and you can find no more reason in ecclesiastical propriety to banish females from the select singers than from the congregation itself. But you will say, It leads to immorality that young men and young women should be placed together in a gallery by themselves. We answer, that in English society men and women are and *must* be thrown together in all sorts of places; in omnibuses they almost sit on one another's knees; in kitchens and servants' halls their intercourse has no restraint: so in drawing-rooms, streets, parks, ball-rooms, every where. Are bad thoughts more likely to be dwelt upon in church than elsewhere? In fact, *are* people brought together so closely in music-galleries as to make this danger one to be spoken of? In our experience, we have seen nothing to warrant such a statement. We have often been present in choirs both of males only, and of males and females mixed; and as the result of our observations, we say without hesitation, that in general women are infinitely better behaved than men, and men than boys; and that the mixed choirs are always less noisy and less rude than the sham-orthodox male ones. The presence of women is generally a check, and without them men's choirs too often become mere bear-gardens; for musical men are not usually over-well behaved. "Much music marreth men's manners," says Galen.

Why plain-chant should be more *Gothic* than figured music, we are quite at a loss to understand. The spirit of plain-song seems to us quite contrary to that of Gothic ar-

chitecture. It only endures a naked rigidity, a perfect simplicity, that is quite at variance with the mediæval cathedrals. The principle of mediæval architects was to form long perspectives, to cut pictures in two by the interposition of columns, half to hide half to reveal the size and plan of buildings. The aisles were for processions, which the Gothic eye loved to see dodging among columns, and disappearing and emerging again from behind screens and hangings. Even its principles of colours led to the same result; hence its gilded reredoses, where every detail was lost in a blaze of splendour. *Æsthetically*, what is the value of the rood-screen? Is it not the half-concealment which Goths imagine to be the mother of reverence, and which certainly in itself produces very charming effects? The general effect sought by mediæval architects is, that no one feature should be prominent; that all should be well balanced; that outlines should be fretted away by details, and that unity should be the result of multiplicity. Apply this rule to music, and certainly you will not have plain-chant. The masses of Haydn and Mozart, Cherubini and Beethoven, will be found to approximate much more nearly to the ideal. Those who take away counterpoint and colouring from music, seem to us much more like those who cut out tracery from Gothic windows, who shave off pinnacles from gables and crockets from pinnacles, who plaster up clustered columns into square piers, who cut away foliated arcades to make place for flat square marble tablets, and who lay the whitewash thick over the frescoed walls of a cathedral, than like those who originally produced the tracery, pinnacles, clustered columns, and frescoed walls. The plain-song is the simple rigid column, standing up naked and alone like an Egyptian pyramid or the monument of London. Counterpoint wreathes around it niches and arches and pinnacles, half concealing the original element, and reducing it to be a mere member of an organised whole instead of an individual standing by itself. Plain-song is mere surface; counterpoint and harmony give depth. In plain-song, the one unvarying melody drags itself along, always predominant, always forcing itself on the ear, never allowing a moment's rest from its obtrusive importunity. In counterpoint, the various parts come uppermost by turns; or if not, if the harmony is simple, at least the chief part is so toned down by its accessories that it loses its monotony; the bare wall is supported by systems of flying buttresses, and the same emotions enter through the ear that the intricate interlacings of Gothic architecture operate through the eye.

But there is one accidental circumstance in which a pa-

rallel can be drawn between plain-chant and Gothic architecture. As the architect delights in making his building look slender and weak, and yet be really strong; as he loves to conceal from the eye the massive supports, and to seem to hang vaults and pendants upon nothing,—so does many a Gregorianiser love to seem strong where he is really weak. He loves to play at monks; to gather together fathers of families, and young men suffering under their first romantic attachment; to dress them in cassocks and surplices, and seat them in the chancel, so as to look at least like a college, if not like a convent of canons-regular. But is this more in accordance with the ecclesiastical spirit than mixed choirs in their proper place? A lot of fellows—who may be perhaps Protestants, infidels, even Jews—are got together, dressed up to look like what they are not, brought into the immediate neighbourhood of the Holy of Holies, where they have no right to be, screened and separated off from the profane laity, of whom they may be the very dregs; and in order that they may deceive the ear as well as the eye, and impose on the weak imagination, they are made to sing the sourest, crudest, most tedious plain-song, like a set of Trappists or Capuchins. And yet the same people who perpetrate this notable sham cry out aloud against Mr. Compo's false Gothic, against iron shafts to imitate stone, plaster vaultings and papier-mâché crockets, all the time that they are coining false monks, and dressing up their footmen and stable-boys in copes and surplices to make them look like ecclesiastics. Sham is sham in all departments. We may respect a father of a family who every night as the clock strikes nine goes with his household into the domestic oratory, and after fumbling about for a minute behind a curtain, comes forth attended by his butler and footmen in surplices, and forthwith twists his mouth into a gurgyle in his struggles to intone the litanies in true Gothic mode,—we may respect such a one; but, for ourselves, we must say we like to take fashions of worship as we find them, and not to dig up usages that died out centuries ago. To do so encourages those who declare that the Catholic worship is a thing of the past; and that when an attempt at revival is made, all that can be done is to show how alien it is from all realities of the day.

Our third humour was that of theological owls, who try to make us believe that plain-song is part of the Incarnation, or a development of the doctrine of the Trinity. And yet we cannot but confess that there are many most grave and wise persons, who judge on more sober grounds that the plain-song is the music which has most ecclesiastical authority; that it is

the traditional chant of the Church, the music which permits the words to be most distinctly heard; which allows each word to be pronounced with perfect precision; that dwells just long enough on each phrase to help and not to mar meditation; that does not distract the attention; that does not consume time in senseless repetitions of the words,* but goes on in a straightforward business-like way to its end; that encourages no vanity of personal exhibitions in the singers; that allows no shakes and roulades of the prima donna; and that separates church-music from the music of the theatre, the drawing-room, the pot-house, and the parade-ground, by an impassable gulf. These certainly are no mean advantages, if they really belong to the plain-song; and may even go far to compensate for its awful dullness. *Æsthetic* improvements in the services are not always accompanied with corresponding personal improvements in Christians. "Formerly," says St. Boniface, "we had wooden chalices and golden priests; now our chalices are of gold and our priests of wood." We lately found in a French library the diary of the Superior of the English branch of an order which we will not name. In the year 1787 he wrote, "The zeal of our missionaries is greatly abated since they began to vie with others in building elegant chapels, in singing High Mass, and setting up organs. The young people of both sexes, instead of being instructed in their religion and in their moral duties, are taught music and singing; and strolling companies of singers go from chapel to chapel to perform their parts for hire or for drink: this disorder prevails chiefly in Lancashire, which formerly was respected for the religion and piety of its Catholic inhabitants, and for being the nursery of ecclesiastics and nuns." Again, in 1788, he notes, "The rage for building chapels still continues; one of our brethren having undertaken to build one at — without having sufficient funds to carry it on, was obliged to skulk out of the county to screen himself from the pursuits of the workmen. Had he consulted and been advised by —, such a disgrace would not have befallen him." So, in 1762, an author writes of the great English College at Douai, "There used to be a good choir of musicians there; but they have in great part abandoned the cultivation of this talent, because they said it turned the scholars away from the study of things of more importance." It cannot be denied that there was once a question of the Pope's forbidding all contrapuntal music, and that a mass of Palestrina saved the art from proscription; nor, again, that

* No; but it repeats syllables senselessly enough,—quite in the haw-haw style.

the Cardinal-Vicar of Rome has lately protested against figured music, and has already eliminated instruments of percussion (drums, cymbals, triangles, and harps) from ecclesiastical orchestras. But before we gather any thing from these acts, we must learn exactly what they were directed against. The contrapuntal music used in the Church before Palestrina did not move the disgust of Popes and Cardinals because it was so beautiful, but because it was so ugly and so tedious. Antiphons written in nineteen parts in canon; no rules observed; horrible discords every where; no rhythm; profane songs, *with their words*, sometimes brought in to accompany the *canto fermo*,—these were some of the abuses. The patience of ecclesiastics was tired out; they were thinking of abolishing the whole concern, when Palestrina showed them that counterpoint was not necessarily either tedious, ugly, or unrhythmical. By the reform he introduced he did not widen the distance between secular and ecclesiastical music; on the contrary, he brought them nearer together, so near, that he may be said to have identified them. We will defy any one to point out any fundamental difference in style, plan, motive, or rhythm, between Palestrina's masses and his madrigals. He had but one method of writing, one style; this he used whether the piece he had to compose was to religious or profane words, for the church or for the supper-table. Again, any one who has heard the interminable balderdash sometimes played and sung at grand High Masses in Rome, and has been deafened by the drums and trumpets and cymbals, will not wonder that a poor Cardinal, who has often had to sit out a noisy Gloria of an hour in length with an empty stomach, should feel a personal enmity to these crashing instruments, and proscribe them altogether. "But he spoils the orchestra!" What does he know of that? Aristotle says, If you strike a barbarian, ignorant of the art of fence, he immediately claps his hands on the wounded place, or shuts his eyes and hits out right and left, smashing all around him. A man ignorant of music is deafened by drums, cymbals, and triangles; he takes care it sha'n't happen again, and smashes the offenders without considering whether he is doing any damage to the vital organisation of the orchestra.

The meaning, then, of these acts was, not to declare that there is an essential difference between ecclesiastical and secular music (which there is not), but only to guard against certain abuses of tediousness and noise which had crept in. In the middle ages, all music was "Gregorian." Drinking-songs were sung to tunes in the same "modes" as our hymns. The Italians in the sixteenth century sang sometimes indecent

words to music not distinguishable in style or expression from Palestrina's masses or motetts. Queen Elizabeth danced to what would now be a psalm tune. The only reason why Gregorian plain-chant does not still occupy the concert-room is, that no audience would bear it for above ten minutes, because it would then become tiresome and ugly. The unsophisticated listener would not dislike it because it was more fit for the church than for the casino, but because, after the novelty had worn off and the ear had begun to be wearied of the monotony, it would appear to him too ugly for either church or concert-hall. In music, that which is most proper to excite emotions compatible with devotion will always appear most sacred. In sacred music all emotions may find expression in their turn. All that is calm, soothing, elevating, solemn, melancholy or terrible, joyful or triumphant, may express religious feelings to a listener who is in a frame to sympathise. "How beautiful!" exclaimed a man next whom we were sitting, after hearing a slow movement from a symphony of Beethoven; "it is just like sacred music." There is not, and never was in the nature of things, an *essential* distinction between sacred and profane music—the difference is only in accidental associations that time will wear away; for musical expression varies with the age, it is more or less a conventional thing. Handel's love-songs are quite different from Mozart's, and Mozart's from Donizetti's, and Donizetti's from Meyerbeer's; all these may be superseded in time by a new style of amatory music, when they will fall into the category of church music, as indeed Handel's have already done in great measure. If it was not for the association, what a fine hymn the *Marseillaise* would be! The only possible way of providing that a difference between ecclesiastical and secular music shall exist, is by enacting that only such shall be used in churches as will be always too ugly and tiresome to be sung out of them. Now plain-chant, except in moderation, is exactly in this predicament.

We do not intend to take any strong line in this matter. It is one on which we should be sorry to hurt any one's feelings. It is better to deprive the ear of Haydn and Mozart than to scandalise one's brother. But scandal is a consideration that ought to weigh also with the other side. Surely it is better to have attractive than unattractive music; leaving out all consideration of offering to God the best which art can produce, it must be charitable to draw people to their duties by all lawful means. Some may come to hear the music, and stay to worship. It may also be necessary. Some priests depend very much on their bench-rents; and an empty High

Mass is ruin to them. These are the grounds and considerations on which the musical question should be debated: it is folly to make it involve principles and doctrines with which it has no connection; such a course only embroils the fray, and makes mountains out of molehills:

“ when we debate
Our trivial difference loud, we do commit
Murder in healing wounds.”

It is not a subject to lose our tempers about. Though it is true, as Lavater says, that you may often call a man a friend with impunity, when it would be death to tell him that his nose wanted blowing, and that you may more safely impugn a man's religion than his wit; yet, after all, we have no right to say of an opponent, *Nihil ille Deos, nil carmina curat*,—He does not care for religion, for he does not like plain-chant; nor is it a subject which needs any deep theological researches. We can leave such trifles for those who have more leisure. Jeremy Taylor read the Fathers in order to determine whether women might paint their faces. After a painful study of the Greek churches and Latin casuists, he came to the conclusion that the use of rouge might be permitted to “women eminent for virtue, modesty, piety, and charity.”* Such disputes are mere fiddle-faddle, unworthy the attention of a serious man. We remember two learned pundits, in a deep discussion whether the B in the fifth tone should be flat or natural, being interrupted by an impatient priest asking them whether the B in humbug were flat or sharp. We believe this well typifies the contempt with which people in general regard disputes on this subject, when they are carried into the regions of theology or metaphysics. And here we must find fault with the pamphlet against the Goths quoted above, which uses just this fallacy with regard to Gothic architecture. There are only two Gothic churches in Rome; therefore *Roma locuta est, et causa finita est*. Rome speaks on subjects of faith and morals; we please ourselves in matters of taste. We question whether music and architecture are subjects for discussion at all, except on grounds of convenience and expediency. There are no rational, much less theological, principles of music. It is an art that has for its object feelings, not thoughts. Music, therefore, does not depend on syllogisms. A man's opinions about it do not rest on any absolute grounds of reason. Controversy is hopeless. You cannot reason a man out of an opinion which he was never reasoned into. One man will think plain-chant the perfection of Christian expression; another will concede that it is very proper for

* Artificial Handsomeness.

exorcisms, because "that must be ugly which scares the devil." One will be devoted to the "thought-entangled descant" of Bach and the great contrapuntists; others to the Italian melodists, with their "strains that might create a soul under the ribs of death." The fact is, there is beauty in all schools. There is sublimity in Gregorian plain-chant as well as in other kinds of music; only plain-song is naturally so monotonous, that the ear can only bear a certain quantity of it; if we are compelled to listen beyond that limit, great is the bore thereof. The only remedy is distraction and inattention. Wonderful recommendation for music, that the condition of your being able to listen with pleasure is that you should not listen at all! Our advice, then, to persons about to exclude all music but Gregorian from their churches would be the same as *Punch's* advice to persons about to marry—Don't! Confine your plain-song to the Introit and Gradual at High Mass. You may have it throughout the Vespers, except perhaps the Magnificat. For Benediction it is well to return to a less monotonous and more lively kind of melody. The only way in which you can preserve plain-chant, is by not giving people too much of it. If you use it exclusively, you may be sure that some day there will occur "one of those reactions by which the human mind is apt to avenge itself upon a despotism or an outrage."*

Reviews.

THE CHURCH AND YOUNG AMERICA.

Aspirations of Nature. By J. T. Hecker, author of "Questions of the Soul." New York: James Kirker.

SEVERAL late events have contributed to call the attention of the American people to the Catholic Church. The portentous rise of the Knownothings, followed by their disgraceful collapse, and the importance of the Catholic vote to the democratical party, have both been powerful auxiliaries to aid the Church in overcoming the old traditional policy of the Anglo-Saxon race in regard to her. This policy is, to muzzle her so that she cannot make herself heard. It was effected at first by seizing and burning all books and papers written by Catholics, and by fining, imprisoning, or hanging all persons who were found to possess such writings; while at the

* A Word to the Goths, p. 7.

same time all that *could be* said against them, truly or falsely, *was* said, and that in the most public way,—in proclamations, in sermons, in plays, in pamphlets, books, ballads, broadsides, speeches, and conversation. To abuse Popery, was the mark of a good subject and a patriotic Englishman. To have the slightest scruple about the justice of this proceeding, was to call in question the judgment pronounced by Church and State, by government, lawyers, and divines,—it was to abdicate both common sense and loyalty, and to prove oneself not only a fool, but also a traitor and a knave. The tradition grew and took root, till it became a truth as plain to the Anglo-Saxon intellect as the moon in the sky, that every old woman knew quite enough about Popery to refute it; that the cause was judged; that Rome had nothing to say; that the imposture was broken to bits; and now had but to be shovelled away. The great thing to see to, in order to continue this tradition, was that Rome *should* not say any thing: this was at first effected by penal laws, as we have said; next, when these laws were relaxed by the contemptuous pity of those who thought us next to annihilated, by taking care that if we did speak, we should not be listened to. There was, and there is, a conspiracy of all the organs of opinion against us. We had no public to address; and those in possession of the public ear took good care to keep up its prejudice against us. We were not to be heard. In the first place, we were poor fools who had nothing to say. In the second place, we had so much to say, that if simple folks listened to us they would be sure to be carried away by our plausibilities. Our words, our arguments, should be put aside like temptations, or like shameful thoughts. We had a sort of serpent's power of fascination; inherited, of course, from the old serpent. Christians and Britons should keep clear of our influence.

The facts which we have alluded to in America have of themselves made a great breach in this traditional policy. The prying impertinence of the Knownothing "smelling committee" at Boston was the first signal of the fall of that faction. Their indecent investigations in the house of the Sisters of Nôtre Dame, their failure in finding the least thing that could justify their suspicions, the disgraceful exhibition which some of the members of that committee afterwards made of themselves, stirred up the indignation of the respectable classes in America. Then the democratical party, depending as it did so much on the Catholic vote, was compelled in self-defence to defend the Catholics against the attacks of the Knownothings in Congress. But what did honourable members know of Catholicity? Most of them

were Christians unattached; scarcely one had any system of faith: and these men had to defend the Catholic faith with voice and pen against the enemies of the Church, and to defend it in such a manner that public opinion would go with them. There was nothing for it but to begin to study Catholicity; to read its history, to learn its doctrines, to understand its institutions. And this was done. Men, who up to that day had probably never opened a Catholic book, began to read our writers and our journals, and to enter into personal correspondence with Catholics. Strange it was to see the great democratical party suddenly studying Catholic controversy, in order to defend the Church; to hear from the lips of ministers of state and senators eloquent and well-reasoned apologies for the tenets and institutions of Catholics. Such an event gave an impulse to Catholicity, that the whole number of Bishops and priests in the country might have tried for a half-century to produce, and in vain. No Catholic could fail to recognise the hand of Providence in this change—*hæc mutatio dexteræ Excelsi*.

But the interest excited was something deeper than curiosity to know the doctrines and institutions of the Church; there was also a strong sympathy in favour of the Catholics in consequence of the indignities and persecutions which they had suffered; and upon examination their conduct came out in strong contrast with that of their enemies. The Americans are exceedingly jealous of the interference of the clergy with politics. Now the Protestant ministers had been the life and soul of the Knownothing movement, and many had left their pulpits to enter Congress; while the Catholic clergy had remained quietly at their proper posts. The Americans abhor religious questions being made questions of politics; and the Knownothings wished to make the Catholic religion a ground for political disfranchisement; while Catholics upheld the constitutional principle of the separation of religion from politics, and their priests preached peace and concord. The genius of the American institutions requires that all, without distinction of birth, station, wealth, or religion, should have the same common rights and political privileges. But the Knownothings and their preachers aimed at upsetting this principle, and at restricting universal suffrage by introducing distinctions of birth, and by proscribing certain opinions in religion; while the Catholics, with the democratical party, remained faithful to the primitive traditions of the Republic, and defended the universal equality of rights, without distinction of birth or creed. Again, the character on which Americans pride themselves is frankness, free discussion, and manly in-

dependence. The Knownothings were a secret society, sworn to obey an unknown hand, doing their deeds in darkness, and possessing their own private signals and cipher. All this was most contrary to the genius of the country, and to the express advice of the *Farewell Address* of Washington; for whom the Knownothings professed the highest reverence. On the other side, the Catholics courted publicity, and did not fear the light. The Protestant faction proved itself to be anti-American, while the Catholics worked in perfect accord with the constitution; which, on the other hand, was in its principles found to be as favourable to them, as if it had been founded expressly by the Church to secure her own independence.

Besides this favourable attitude of the political world of America, Mr. Hecker finds in the social state of the people of the United States many grounds of hope for their conversion. Though they have for the most part cast off all religion, it is not from want of religious aspirations, but because the popular Protestantism shocks their reason and their moral principles; because the state of so-called Christianity in America is such, that it is an insult to a respectable and moral man to ask him to be converted. And though they plunge wildly and madly into every movement of the day, from "table-tipping" to ruinous speculations, it is rather to fill up the void within them, or in hopes of obtaining some solution to the dark enigmas of life, than from any positive or sovereign attachment to the wretched phantoms which they pursue. Among these men some have tried to put into practice a kind of Christian communism, which, however absurd, required of them the endurance of severe privations and habitual self-denial. Many of them have been rewarded by the usual crown of sincere inquirers—a knowledge of the truth. These converts are merely specimens and samples of the lot. They prove that the field of Transcendentalists and Rationalists is not so barren as one might think. Here in England perhaps, at any rate for the educated classes, our conversions have been from persons whose religion made the nearest approach to the Catholic system. The Free-thinkers and Broad Churchmen have not yielded any great harvest. But perhaps things are different here. Our traders pursue their calling from pure love of gain, not to fill up any void in their being, nor to extract out of cotton or iron an answer to the enigmas of life.

But as things are in America, where the political and the personal movements tending alike to a juster appreciation of the Church, the question arises,—Is advantage to be taken of these movements; or are they to be left to expend themselves without a responsive heaving in the bosom of the Church?

Up to this time the Church in the United States has only been able to occupy herself with her own children. To keep alive the faith in the Catholic adults who were crowding to her shores from all the countries of Europe, and to educate their children in this faith, was her work; a work that required all the resources of an infant Church, and which, considering her scanty means, she has wonderfully well performed. Churches, schools, seminaries, colleges, religious communities, bishoprics and archbishoprics, are rising as if by enchantment in all parts of the Republic. But the Catholic Church is essentially apostolic; she cannot content herself with keeping her own, when she sees around her millions of souls perishing because they are not hers. She is an imperial power; her strength is in fresh conquests,—to stop is to go back. She is an organised whole, where the neglect of any one function weakens and disarranges the rest. Her mission is like her name, *Catholic*, universal, embracing every individual of the human race. She cannot, then, do otherwise than use every means of drawing those without into her fold, especially where hope is so fair as in America. Why should she not spend on these men some of the same devotion and toil which she devotes to the idolaters in the missions of China and Oceania? When savages and heathens have all this care, we may expect something to be done for a civilised and nominally Christian community like that of the United States.

If the work of conversion is to be carried on at all, it requires all a man's heart and all his brains. It is not a function which the Church can commit to her inferior spirits. When the Protestants in France had to be converted, it was no common man that was sent to preach to them; it was Bossuet, or Bourdaloue, or Fenelon,—names which are the glory of the Church, the very first-fruits of France, not to say of the world. So in the letter of the Pope to the Bishops of the province of New York, in 1855, he asks for the devotion of their best to this service. "Leave no means untried to make our most holy religion and its holy doctrine ever receive greater increase in those regions, and to make the unhappy wanderers return to the way of salvation. Spare no care, no consideration, no labour, in shedding the light of the gospel, and gaining to Christ all, even to the last, of the unbelievers to be found in your dioceses sitting in darkness and in the shadow of death."

And now, again, in this jubilee, he directs the intention of the Church especially to the conversion of schismatics, heretics, and heathens. No work can be greater in itself, or more according to the heart of the Church at this present time, than

the devotion of oneself heart and soul to the conversion of the non-Catholics among whom our immediate lot may be cast.

Mr. Hecker, the author of the book before us, has devoted his life to the study of the character of his countrymen, and to putting the Catholic arguments into that shape which his experience tells him is most likely to be effective with them. The first-fruits of his labour was a beautiful volume, called *Questions of the Soul*, of which we gave some notice on its first appearance. The present is a much more mature and more masculine production. The author boldly sets himself to argue with the most practised intellects of the rationalist and transcendental schools, and to tackle them with their own weapons. If the book has not the practical success which every Catholic would desire for it, the fault is not in the author: his argument is perfect; his spirit is most genial; he says not a word that can be repulsive to the most fastidious. But still no art can teach success; it can teach the right way of doing a thing, but cannot promise that no accident shall prevent its effect. It can teach the orator to make a speech that *ought* to convince and persuade; but it cannot guarantee that the audience shall be persuaded, or even that there shall be any audience at all. "You must not expect me," said Dr. Johnson to a person who would not be convinced, "to find you both arguments and understanding." If Mr. Hecker's audience should turn out to be fewer than he supposes, or if they should shut their ears to his charming more obstinately than he thinks they will, still his book remains a monument of the devotion of a very high intellect to the charitable work of smoothing the way for inquirers, and conducting them towards the Church.

And, after all, no man can do more. Conversion is infinitely above man's power; it is in a higher order, in another sphere. No man, no saint, ever did more than prepare the way for God. However God may condescend to use our offices, and to favour our endeavours, yet when we have done the very utmost possible to convince the intellect, prepare the heart, and incline the will, there remains an infinite abyss between the creature and God, which no less than infinite power can bridge over. All that can be asked of man is, in a spirit of charity and humility, and with due preparation, to do that which he judges most conducive to incline and convince those persons whom he has an opportunity of influencing. This is what Mr. Hecker has done: and no one who looks at his book can for a moment doubt that he has expended his whole powers upon the work,—his whole heart and his whole mind have been in it. He has offered his best

to the Church; and his offering is no pretty useless knick-knack, but a well-tempered weapon adapted to the warfare and the tactics of the day.

Mr. Hecker begins with acknowledging that which every person must acknowledge, that *reason* is man's great gift and distinguishing characteristic; hence loyalty to the aspirations of reason is the most noble act of his nature.

All the schools of philosophy have successively attempted to answer these aspirations; and have failed. Yet mankind does not acquiesce in the failure, nor conclude that the aspirations cannot be answered. The answer to them is, Religion: there must be a true religion; it must be Christianity; no other is worth a thought. It cannot be Protestantism, which contradicts reason, shocks conscience, and subverts the dignity of man. It can be no form of scepticism, pantheism, or mere rationalism. It must, then, be Catholicity, which in matter of fact does harmonise with our whole nature. Human nature is such, that if a man is true to his aspirations, he only wants the Catholic Church to be displayed before him in order to recognise its truth. At bottom this argument comes to the same thing as that of Father Deschamps, which we have noticed elsewhere; the difference is in form. Mr. Hecker, writing for a Protestant country, puts the Church last; he begins from his data, from human nature, and works up to the Church: F. Deschamps, writing for a Catholic country, begins with the Church as manifested to all eyes; and shows how, if men are true to their nature, they must recognise her, without any laborious historical inquiry, as the organ of God's truth.

But it is time to let Mr. Hecker speak for himself. Our first extract shall be one that both describes the class of minds to whom he addresses himself, and furnishes the author's estimate of their number:

"There is a large class of men who cherish the lofty aspirations of their nature, and are loyal to their religious convictions. They feel deeply their religious necessities, and yearn and seek after a religion which, at the same time that it answers to these wants, does not contradict the universal dictates of reason.

We have it from authentic sources of information, that this class of minds composes more than one-half of our population who have arrived at the age of manhood; and it includes many, if not most of our intellectually-gifted and noble-minded countrymen.

What has brought about this state of things? Does it spring from a want of religious sentiment, or earnestness on their part? We opine that it does not. No people are more susceptible of religious impressions, no people are more in earnest in all that regards religion, than the American people. Witness the countless churches,

the Sunday-school unions, missionary enterprises, Bible and tract societies, and other religious institutions, broadcast over this extensive land. The man who would charge our people with infidelity, scepticism, or indifference in religious matters, would only display his unacquaintance with the heart and mind of the nation.

What, then, is the cause of this strange phenomenon of a people sincerely and earnestly religious, and yet having no fixed Christian belief? Ask them, and those who have reflected will answer in the lines of the poet Schiller:

‘What’s my religion? None of all the sects
Which thou hast named. And why not?
From RELIGION.’

The prevailing beliefs have presented religion in such a light that men of mature thought could not, without a feeling approaching to shame, and a certain sense of self-degradation, submit to their pretensions.

If Christianity be presented to men in such a way as to leave but the one choice, either to become fanatics or to profess no religion, where is there one who possesses a spark of reason, or has a manly feeling in his breast, that would not rather stand aloof from all religious sects, and pay such worship to his Creator as accords with the dictates of reason and the inward convictions of the soul? Reliance on the rational convictions of our nature is the first of all duties.”

After indicating the class of minds he has in view, the author describes the kind of religion which such a mind would demand. He distributes his description under three heads—Man, Religion, and Church. To begin with “Man:”

“‘The possession of truth, not the simple search of it, is the true end of reason, and the source of all true life. Whenever, therefore, the truth is presented to the mind with rational and sufficient evidence, it matters not by whom, to withhold one’s assent is to reduce reason to the ignominious servitude of passion, and to inflict upon the soul the most painful of deaths—the death of inanition. . . .

‘Reason affirms its own authority, and can admit of no other which does not support its claims and coincide with its dictates. Of all forms of slavery, that of the soul is the most abject, degrading, and cruel. . . .

‘Endowed with reason, man has no right to surrender his judgment. Endowed with free-will, man has no right to yield up his liberty. Reason and free-will constitute man a responsible being, and he has no right to abdicate his independence. Judgment, liberty, independence, these are divine and inalienable gifts; and man cannot renounce them if he would.

‘As an intellectual being, man has the right to know the truth. As a moral being, man has the right to follow the truth. Any authority that interferes with our exercise of these violates the natural rights of man, and insults their Divine Author.

‘The assent of reason to truth is not the subjection of reason,

but its sublimest assertion. The voluntary following of truth is not a restriction of our free-will, but the only and the truest expression of its liberty. The acknowledgment and acceptance of truth constitute man's true independence, dignity, and glory.

'Man cannot be thought of consistently with just and honourable ideas of his Creator otherwise than as good, in possession of all his faculties, whose primal tendencies are in accordance with the great end of his being.

'There is no earthly dignity equal to that of human nature; for there is stamped upon it, in glowing characters, the perfect resemblance of its Divine Author.

'Let us therefore be loyal to the dictates of reason, knowing that they will lead us to our archetype and Divine original.

'Let the light of truth be our guide. Let reason be our authority. We fear not to follow where they point the way. What contradicts reason contradicts God.' "

This being the judgment of reason concerning itself, its judgment concerning some of the broad characteristics of religion are easily deducible from it:

" 'We go forth in earnestness and in hope, with the sacred torch of reason in our hand, to seek, to find, and to accept true religion, resolved at the same time to cast aside all creeds and systems of belief which exact the surrender of our judgment, independence, or liberty.

'If we find a religion to tell us that the truth we see is not truth, but falsehood; if we find a religion to tell us that the good we love is not good, but evil; if we find a religion to tell us that our good deeds are not virtues, but vices; we in indignation answer, "To the dogs with such a religion. We ask not its heaven, nor fear its hell. Such a religion comes not down from heaven, but up from the bottomless pits below."

'A religion which gainsays the plain dictates of reason, is hostile to our holiest affections or mutilates our nature; is no religion, but a base imposition. It is treason against God and human nature to listen to this horrid and impious creed. No, rather die a heathen or infidel than submit to a religion which outrages God by making the creatures of His own likeness abject, base, accursed.

'We say, with the voice and the united energies of our soul and the Author of our being, "Let the religion perish from the face of the earth which invades the sacred boundaries that constitute man's reason, or which would diminish the dignity of human nature."

'Reason's certitude is anterior to all other certitude; hence its authority is indisputable, and, in its own sphere, supreme. The denial of this is the undermining of the foundations of all knowledge of truth and of all religious belief, and opens the way to the triumph of atheism. The first step of the true religion is to confirm the rightful authority of reason, to call forth the full exercise of its powers, to elicit its free and undivided assent, and look to it for its confirmation, support, and defence.

‘ A religion, therefore, that is not an imposition, a fraud, cannot move a single step independently of the voluntary assent and suffrage of reason. Its first duty is to afford rational and sufficient evidence of the doctrines which it teaches. Let it look to this for the sake of its own honour; for a religion which interdicts the right exercise of reason, or violates its laws, exposes itself sooner or later to the just indignation of all intelligent thinkers.

‘ No truth or doctrine of religion is really believed and held without an act of the intelligence and will. These united constitute man’s rational nature. A religion unsupported by the inward witness and free assent of reason to its truth is no religion, but a delusion, an hypocrisy. For man, as a rational being, cannot, if he would, embrace a religious belief which is contrary to his essential nature—reason.

‘ As, on one hand, religion is bound to attest with satisfactory evidence the divine origin of the truths which it proposes to our belief, so, on the other hand, we are bound to accept the truths so presented. To believe is not less a function of reason than to know, or to perform any other of its normal operations. The refusal, therefore, of our belief to truths duly attested is a violation of our allegiance to reason; and, if consistently carried out, would end in its entire overthrow.

‘ Religion adds no new faculty to the soul. A sure mark of its divine origin is, that when fairly presented it meets and welcomes all the honest demands of the intellectual and moral faculties of our nature, and in such a way as to produce an entire conviction of its truth. True religion opens to our intellectual vision the great end of our existence, and so directs, strengthens, and excites our will and its energies that we reach it.

‘ It should not be forgotten that the destiny of the soul and body is one and indivisible. For man is soul and body, inseparably united in one person. The body, therefore, has a religious purpose. “Nothing is holier than that high form.” A religion which is of divine origin must be adapted, in its doctrines and worship, to the whole of man’s nature. . . .

‘ It is a necessity, therefore, to find a religion coinciding with the dictates of reason, and commensurate with the wants of our whole nature, or else to wait for its revelation.’”

And “man” and “religion” being thus stated, it is easy to see of what character social religion, or the Church, must be, in order to contradict neither “man” nor “religion:”

“ ‘ Religion is a question between God and the soul. No human authority, therefore, has any right to enter its sacred sphere. The attempt is sacrilegious.

‘ Every man was made by his Creator to do his own thinking. What right, then, has one man, or a body of men, to dictate their belief, or make their private convictions or sentiments binding upon others?

‘ There is no degradation so abject as the submission of the eternal interests of the soul to the private authority or dictation of any man or body of men, whatever may be their titles. Every right sentiment in our breast rises up in abhorrence against it.

‘ A Church which is not of divine origin, and claims assent to its teachings or obedience to its precepts on its own authority, is an insult to our understandings, and deserves the ridicule of all men who have the capacity to put two ideas together.

‘ A Church that claims a divine origin, in order to be consistent, must also claim to be unerring; for the idea of teaching error in the name of the Divinity is blasphemous.

‘ A Church, if it deserves that title, must yield us assistance, and not we the Church. The Church that needs our assistance we despise. Only the Church which has help from above for mankind, and is conscious of it, is a divine institution.

‘ A Church that has its origin in heaven is an organ of divine inspiration and life to humanity. For religion is not only a system of divinely given truths, but also the organ of a divine life. Life and its transmission is inconceivable, independent of an organism. The office of the Church, therefore, is not only to teach divine truths, but also to enable men to actualise them.

‘ If entrance into the Church is not a step to a higher and holier life, the source of a larger and more perfect freedom, her claims do not merit a moment’s consideration. Away with the Church that reveals not a loftier manhood, and enables men to attain it.

‘ The object of the Church authority is not to lay restraints on man’s activity, but to direct it aright; not to make him a slave, but to establish his independence: the object of Church authority is to develop man’s individuality, consecrate and defend his rights, and elevate his existence to the plane of his divine destiny.

‘ Divine religion appeals to man’s holiest instincts, and inspires the soul with a sublime enthusiasm. A Church without martyrs is not on equality with the institution of the family or state; for they are not wanting in heroes. A Church that ceases to produce martyrs is dead.

‘ Hearts are aching to be devoted to the down-trodden and suffering of the race. Breasts are elated with heroic impulses to do something in the noble cause of truth and God. And shall all these aspirations and sentiments, which do honour to our nature, be wasted, misspent, or die out for want of sanction and right direction? Who can give this sanction? Who can give this direction? No one but God’s Church upon earth. This is her divine mission.

‘ In concert with the voice of all those who are conscious of their humanity, we demand a visible and divine authority to unite and direct the aspirations and energies of individuals and nations to great enterprises for the common welfare of men upon earth and for eternity.’ ”

These demands of an earnest seeker Mr. Hecker fearlessly allows to be admissible, and boldly promises to satisfy. The

Catholic, he says, admits all this; and as a theologian he is right. It is quite beside the purpose to urge that the nature which Mr. Hecker describes is not mere human nature, without any supernatural helps, but nature assisted by tradition of a primitive revelation, by the grace which God denies to none, and by the atmosphere of a Christian civilisation. The question is not, whether the aspirations described by Mr. Hecker are those of a nature *in puris naturalibus*, or of the nature of a Christian unattached, with many a rag and remnant of revealed truth worked into his system; the question is, are they not, in fact, the aspirations of the non-Catholic inquirers with whom Mr. Hecker has to deal? Nor, again, ought any one to object to Mr. Hecker, that though he adopts the terms and phrases of the Rationalists and Transcendentalists, and uses their propositions as the foundation of his argument, yet he does not use them in the same sense as they do, and therefore he may do more harm by seeming to admit their principles, than good by proving that from the same principles, *differently developed*, Catholicity may be shown to be the answer to human needs. Of course he does not use the principles in the same sense, otherwise he would develop them in the same way. The Transcendentalist starts, like Mr. Hecker, from the principle that nature aspires to God; but because nature cannot find God for itself, Transcendentalism, unless it goes beyond nature, must put up with a very strange God and a stranger religion. A story is told of two Americans of this school going to see Elssler dance. "Margaret," quoth he, "this is poetry." "No, Ralph," rejoined she, "it is religion." Nature aspires to God, and turns aside to a ballet. No, says Mr. Hecker, remember your first principles; carry them out. If they lead to absurdity in one direction, try them in another; you are more certain of the truth of your principles than of the truth of your deductions from them. We admit the same foundation; you build upon it your system, I build upon it the necessity of the Catholic Church: compare our processes, our arguments, and see whose is best, whose satisfies the wants of the soul most completely. Meditate on your principles more deeply; understand them more thoroughly; and see whether they do not lead my way rather than yours. There is nothing in all this to give unbelievers the least handle for supposing that Mr. Hecker admits their principles as they understand them. As they understand them, they do not lead to Mr. Hecker's conclusions; when they see these conclusions deduced from them, they must review their own, and distinctly affirm either that their ballets, or their mystification, or their dreams of progress, are

the things which nature aspires to,—in which case they prove themselves not to be of the number for whom Mr. Hecker writes; or they must be loyal to their nature, and own that now at last they have found a religion which satisfies the demands of their reason and their heart; that now they see how nature can rise above nature, how God has bridged over the impassable gulf, and answered the cry of His creatures.

The manliness and boldness of Mr. Hecker's method is shown quite as much in the willingness with which he acknowledges good wherever he finds it, and finds out the mission which men outside the Church have accomplished. Thus of Dr. Channing he speaks:

“To expose the character of this religion, hostile to man's nature, and which cloaked itself with the garb of evangelical Christianity, and to induce men to throw off its awfully oppressive and degrading servitude by exciting in them the moral sense, by stimulating the consciousness of their manhood, and by exalting the dignity of man,—this was the task of Dr. Channing. His mission, therefore, was a great, good, and noble one; and nobly he performed it.”

Of Mr. Emerson:

“Mr. Emerson's appeals are the voice of an outraged conscience and an oppressed reason, claiming their rights and freedom in tones of manly sincerity and courage. This attitude excites admiration; and in view of the wretched tenets he was taught to believe in his early childhood, one may easily overlook the one-sided views and the exaggerations uttered in protest against them. Certain passages in his writings shock all well-regulated and genuine religious feeling; but indulgence may even be extended here, for these are only counter-statements of greater indignities offered to God by a false Christianity. Honour is due to his boldly upholding the worth and dignity of man; yet it is equally a subject of deep regret, that perversion of his splendid abilities to the circulation of the abominable theories of the German pantheistical atheists.”

The Church is large and wide; she surrounds and envelops our nature; she catches hold of one man by one point, of another by another. She has sympathies for the anxious inquiring Rationalist or Transcendentalist, as well as for the Puseyite or the Russian. She has her method of speaking to the heart of the one as well as of the other. In all kinds and developments of nature she finds points of contact—hooks to which she may attach her cords of love.

But boldness, manliness, and largeness of view are not the only features of excellence of this book: terseness, strength, very often wit, especially in the short summings-up of the principles that have been discussed. The following is the sum of Fichte's system:

"Philosophy defined in the spirit of Fichte would be: The dialogue of a man with his own shadow. And God is nothing else than man's intuition of his own nature considered as an independent existence. In keeping with his transcendental philosophy, Fichte, at the close of one of his celebrated lectures at Berlin, announced the subject of the subsequent evening as follows: 'To-morrow evening, gentlemen, I will construct God.'"

Again, the Protestant doctrine of the inherent evil of every act performed by man, as summed up in the eighth of the Thirty-nine Anglican Articles, is thus stated:

"'Works done by unregenerate men are sinful.' 'Yet the neglect of them is displeasing to God.' It follows, then, that we displease God by not doing 'sinful works.' Such is the manifest absurdity, impiety, and blasphemy of the purified Christianity taught by the great 'Gospel Doctors.' The best compendium of these wretched tenets is the following:

'You shall and you sha'n't,
You can and you can't,
You will and you won't;
You'll be damned if you do,
You'll be damned if you don't.'"

Our last quotation shall be one of more historical interest, showing, from the confessions of Protestants, the results of Protestantism in the United States:

"If more evidence were needed of the wretched failure of Protestant Christianity in this country, we would refer the reader to a remarkable report of five Protestant Episcopal Bishops on a memorial addressed to their body by some of its most distinguished ministers and laymen, which 'proceeds on the assumption that the Episcopal Church, confined to the exercise of her present system, is not adequate to do the work of the Lord in this land and in this age.' Among communications from their own members, there are a few from 'eminent clergymen of different names.' We give a specimen from one entitled, 'From a Baptist divine:'

'The present state of the Christian Church, and its relation to the world, is anomalous, and almost shocking to a Christian. Especially is this the case in this country. Here is no persecution; the Word of God is open; ministers more numerous than in any Protestant country, and working ministers than in any Papal country, I presume. There is nothing visible to prevent the universal dominion of Christianity; and what is the result? The number of professors of religion is diminishing in all our sects. The churches are coming to a stand for want of ministers. There is hardly a distinction observable between Christians and other men in practice, so far as all the forms of worldliness are concerned. The conscience of Christians, in too large a proportion of cases, is below the average of men who have no guide but natural conscience. Let a case arise

in which Christians and other men come into contact, and the Christian will do things which an honourable man would despise. To ask an honourable man of no profession to be converted, meaning that he should be such a man as many whom he sees professing Christianity, would be frequently hardly less than insulting. Hence infidelity abounds, and waxes strong. Humanity is rather showing itself out of the Church than in it. Men care more for their political parties than for the precepts of Christ; and on every political question, in Congress and out of it, sacrifice one to the other.

‘This is abnormal. Christ and His apostles never contemplated it. In twenty or thirty years, at the present rate of diminution, the candlestick will be removed out of its place. . . . The Church has no conversions, and no hold on the masses. The most successful church-building is that which includes the poor by necessity.’ . . . His communication ends with the frank acknowledgment of the fact, that ‘If what we see is all Christianity can do, it is a failure.’”

With this we must close, recommending the book to our readers as perhaps the most important controversial work for the present day that we have yet had to review.

IDEOLOGY OF ST. THOMAS.

Essay on the Origin of our Knowledge, according to the Philosophy of St. Thomas. By John Walker. London: Richardson and Son.

IN the contests of metaphysicians about the “origin of ideas,” the maxim that “truth lies in the middle” is constantly illustrated. Man is neither an angel nor a brute: though he has, on the one hand, what is proper to angels, a spiritual soul; and on the other hand, what is proper to brutes, a material body,—yet it has been the temptation of one school of philosophers to forget that he has a soul, and of the other to forget that he has a body. In company with Mr. Walker’s treatise, which we have placed at the head of this article, there is lying before us a little French work on Psychology, in which the author characteristically begins, “*L’homme, c’est l’âme humaine.*” That is one extreme. Had he been of the opposite school, he would have probably commenced somewhat in this strain:—“*Qu’est ce que c’est que l’homme? L’homme c’est la matière organisée,*” as in truth the materialists actually held. Plato taught that ideas were born in us. Aristotle taught that the mind was originally blank, and was wholly stocked by sensible experience. Malebranche went so

far on the one side as to regard sensation as a source of error which only obscured the eternal brightness of our inborn ideas; and Locke went so far on the other, as to doubt *if matter could not think*. Mr. Walker has an excessive dread of exaggerating on the spiritualistic side, which to our mind detracts somewhat from the value of his otherwise able and useful pamphlet. He wishes to impress upon his readers, what certainly should be borne in mind, "that angels are spirits only; but men are of an inferior and compound nature, that is, of body and soul united," and that consequently "the laws which govern the knowledge of angels can never alone, according to him [St. Thomas], be made the criterion of the conditions of human ideas." Thus far we certainly agree with Mr. Walker; but we cannot acquit him of error on the materialistic side when he says, or rather makes St. Thomas say, that the soul "*is essentially dependent upon the body for its existence and operations*" (p. 29). We cannot bring ourselves to believe that St. Thomas held such a doctrine; nor, if he actually held it, could we bring ourselves to believe it merely because he held it. But of this matter presently.

As a preface to the following remarks on the subject of Mr. Walker's pamphlet, we cannot help observing, that we are far from wanting in a just appreciation of its real merits. He has brought before the studious public a subject which is interesting for its own sake, and which is more interesting to many persons from its connection with Catholic theology; and we have to thank him for the generally correct statement of a system of ideology which, in spite of some old-fashioned errors, is entitled to the veneration of every Catholic mind. Having done our author this justice, we feel less scruple in stating boldly in what we absolutely differ from him. How far we agree *with him* he will see in the course of this paper; though whether he will agree *with us* even where we agree with him, we cannot exactly tell.

Mr. Walker's object in writing the treatise of ideology according to the philosophy of St. Thomas is twofold: *first*, to give an exposition of the doctrine of St. Thomas; and *secondly*, upon that ground to confute the Idealists. Now as regards the first point, we think he sometimes errs in his exposition from the natural bias of his own mind towards the sensationalist side; and as far as the second point is concerned, we have grave doubts whether the form of idealism which he is combating has any existence in this present age.

As an instance of what we cannot help deeming a misconception of his author, take the above-mentioned statement

that "the soul *is essentially* dependent upon the body for its existence and operations." This doctrine is attributed to St. Thomas. Wherefore? Perhaps because St. Thomas teaches that the soul is "the *form* of the body:" at least no other reason is assigned. "It is an important part of his [St. Thomas's] method to lay down clearly the principle that the soul does not merely make use of the body as an instrument, or that the essence of man does not merely reside in his soul, but that the soul is the very *form* of the body, and is essentially dependent upon the body for its existence and operations; showing himself at the same time ready to meet all the objections which may be raised from the future existence of the soul when separated for a time from the body." But if the soul of *its very essence* depends upon a body to exist and operate, how can it exist and operate without a body? We can see no possible answer to this objection. Mr. Walker has given us no clue to the solution of this difficulty, as he should have done, by citing the very words of St. Thomas for a statement certainly the most important in his pamphlet.* However, what does St. Thomas mean by saying that the soul is the form of the body? The answer to this question may throw some light upon the question, which has great relations with his doctrine on the origin of ideas. He means, then, exactly the opposite of what his expounder makes him mean; but in order to verify this assertion, we must beg our readers' indulgence whilst we explain what is meant in scholastic phraseology by the terms *matter* and *form*, which are frequently misunderstood.

The *form* of a thing, then, is that which makes it be what it is; and the *matter* is the stuff or material of which it is made. Thus the form of a statue is what makes the statue to be a statue, viz. the type, *idea*, communicated by the artist; and this is why ideas are called *forms* by the old philosophers: and the matter of a statue, again, is the material, marble or plaster, of which the statue is made. The matter is, in school phrase, *indifferent* to receive divers forms, *i. e.* the plaster or marble of which the statue is made might make something else, suppose a pedestal, or a door-post; it is the form which makes it what it is, a statue. Since it is the form which makes a thing what it is, the word acquired a secondary

* St. Thomas has the following passage, which may possibly be the one upon which Mr. Walker bases his assertion: "Sed in quantum anima est forma corporis, non habet esse seorsum ab esse corporis; sed per suum esse corpori unitur" (i. lxxvi. art. 6). But to say that the soul has no *esse* apart from the body (*i. e.* that body and soul are joined together, which St. Thomas is proving in the article), is a very different thing from saying that the soul owes its existence *essentially* to the body.

meaning, and began to stand for the nature or essence of a thing. However, St. Thomas would use the term in the passage signified by Mr. Walker in its primary meaning, simply because the secondary meaning, that *the soul is the essence of the body*, would make nonsense. Now we see what the angelic doctor means by affirming that the soul is the form of the body; he means that it is the soul which makes the body to be what it is, a living human body. He asserts a very homely truth—that the matter which makes our body would be so much lifeless earth; but that the soul *informs*,* quickens it, and makes it a human body. Thus, to our mind, St. Thomas asserts the direct opposite to what he is made to say; and so far from supposing that the soul owes its existence and operations to the body, we consider that we express the opinion of St. Thomas when we assert that the body, as a living body, owes its existence and operations to the soul. Mr. Walker, again, quotes some dogmatical definitions of Popes Clement, Leo, and of the present Pope Pius IX., to the same effect, viz. that the soul is the form of the body; and to these decisions he affixes the interpretation which we have just called in question, but by which we understand, as just stated, that the body is quickened by the soul; and in that sense we understand, and in that sense only *can* we understand, how this same word ‘form’ was introduced into the condemnation of Gunther, which Mr. Walker instances; for Gunther held, if we remember rightly, that the body was not quickened by the soul *per se*, but by a certain medium, the *nerve-spirit*, made so much of by Mrs. Crowe in her *Nightside of Nature*, and which is borrowed by her from Ebenozzer and the German pneumatologists. But, what is very important, St. Thomas himself, when he says that the soul is the *form* of the body (quæst. lxxvi. art. 6), is refuting the very same error of a *nerve-spirit*. “But some [of the Platonists],” he says, “said that it [the soul] is united to the body by means of a *corporeal spirit*,”† so that Pope Pius IX., in his condemnation of the triple principle of Gunther, would naturally avail himself of the very language used by St. Thomas in condemning the same error. Again, since the soul in this life exists only as the form of the body, and acts only through it and with it, some difficulty—but not an insuperable difficulty—might be urged as to its existence when separated from the body; but on the hypothesis of Mr. Walker, that the

* *Informare*,—a word often used by the theologians (and poets) in the sense here assigned to it. Thus Dryden: “And o’er-inform the tenement of clay.”

† “Quidam vero dixerunt quod unitur corpori mediante spiritu corporeo.” (St. Thom. Summ. loc. citat.)

soul *essentially* owes its existence to the body, the objection becomes at once triumphantly unanswerable.

Neither can we agree with Mr. Walker that there is any real discrepancy between the view of St. Thomas and that of Bishop Butler regarding the relation of soul and body. Bishop Butler insists that the soul uses the body as an instrument. St. Thomas only asserts that it (the body) is not merely an instrument, like a knife or a stick, but is joined so as to become *one* with the soul. True, Bishop Butler maintains that it is not the eye or ear which sees and hears, but that the soul sees with the eye and hears with the ear; whereas Aristotle, and St. Thomas after him, both maintain that what acts is neither soul nor body separately, but the united *natures*. However, these apparently opposed views may be easily reconciled; and, indeed, they owe their origin to the same source—Aristotle. Surely our phrase, *bodily organs*, is not a mere figure of speech; but if it mean any thing at all, it means that the mind uses the bodily eye much as the eye uses a glass, where both eye and glass really act, but the source of vision is in the eye, not in the glass. Hence Epicharmus, whom Aristotle quotes:

“What sees is Mind, what hears is Mind;
The ear and eye are deaf and blind.”

Bishop Butler, then, would not deny that the “united nature” acts, but he would say that the source of action is in the soul; and that is what is meant by saying, *Mind sees, and Mind hears*.* The Scholastics would bring in here a distinction common amongst them. The “*principium quod agit*,” they would say, “is the united nature;” the “*principium quo agitur*” is the human soul.” Indeed, all this is involved in the expression, that the soul is the form of the body. We shall meet it again presently; for it is the very sum of St. Thomas’s doctrine on the origin of ideas.

With this introduction, we approach the main subject of the pamphlet. What was the doctrine of St. Thomas on the origin of our knowledge? Did he teach that the soul is “in possession of thought antecedently to any influence of the body?” Does it “join the body with some knowledge of its own, and only make use of the body to exhibit and develop its idea?” Are there “*innate ideas*?” To these questions, Mr. Walker, upon the principle that the soul owes its existence and operations to the body, would be forced to give a decided, an unconditioned negative. Indeed, we agree that

* Aristotle, ap. Sir W. Hamilton; Reid, note D. The verse of Epicharmus is freely translated; in the Greek it is thus: Νοῦς ὁρᾷ καὶ Νοῦς ἀκούει, τὰλλα κωφὰ καὶ τυφλά.

there is no reason to suppose that the soul begins to exist before the body. But as to the question of innate ideas, after the light of recent investigations made in France and Germany, we should be more cautious in the statement of the question. Did any philosopher ever teach that the idea of his horse, or his dog, or his coat, was innate? No; but by innate ideas Plato and his followers meant the celebrated *universals*, which made such a stir in the middle ages between the Realists and the Nominalists. Are, then, universals innate? In the sense of Plato, no. That doctrine is now obsolete. Is any portion of our knowledge innate; and is any portion acquired? "Both the one and the other," answer the Moderns. "In every idea, howsoever universal it be, such as *man, animal, wisdom, virtue*, together with the *à-priori* element, which is necessarily implied, is mingled an *à-posteriori* or empirical element, which comes from the senses. And in every simple notion, howsoever particular it be, together with the empirical element is mingled an *à-priori* element, of which experience can render no adequate account." This is the teaching of Kant, and we stated in a former article how consistent it is with the doctrine of St. Thomas; so much so, that Balmez, who compares the German with the angelic doctor, is half persuaded that the former borrowed from the latter. Kant proposed to solve the very problem which Mr. Walker proposes to solve; for whereas some said, with Plato and Father Malebranche, that our ideas were innate, whilst others said, with Aristotle and Locke, that they were acquired by sensible experience, he wished to know which side had the right. He taught, as the result of his investigations, that in every cognition there is an innate element and an acquired element. The innate element Kant called the *form* of our knowledge, and the acquired element he called the *matter*. St. Thomas also admitted an innate element and acquired element, which he designates by the same terminology. Aristotle had said, "There is nothing in the intellect which was not first in the sense." St. Thomas agrees; but with a modification which Mr. Walker may consider as our answer to his objection: "It cannot be said," says St. Thomas, "that sensible cognition is the total and perfect cause of intellectual cognition; but rather it is, in a certain way, the *matter* of the cause" (i. q. lxxxiv. art. 6). Here again we are brought to consider the old terms *matter* and *form*, which puzzle the uninitiated. He means that a sensation, unless it be illumined by the intelligence, is nothing more than a mere feeling; it is the form furnished by the intelligence which makes it what it is—an idea.

Kant discovered the absolute necessity of admitting an

innate element in our knowledge, because he found that upon analysing certain judgments (synthetical, *à-priori*) they possessed the characteristics of *universality* and *necessity*. We will explain his meaning. Take the following judgment: "Every thing which happens must have a cause." Whence is the possibility of forming it? that is to say, upon what grounds do you join the subject and predicate together, which is essential to the formation of a judgment? In some judgments the predicate is found in the very idea of the subject [analytical judgments], such as, "matter is extended." The same difficulty does not attach to them, because the predicate is discovered in the subject, and is evolved by analysis; as in the present instance, where the notion of extent is involved in the very notion of matter, matter being something extended. But this is not the case with the judgment, "Every thing which happens must have a cause;" the notion "*cause*" is not contained in the notion "*whatsoever happens*." Again, the possibility of some other judgments is based upon experience. We say that *sugar is sweet*, that *crabs are sour*, that *bodies are heavy*, because experience tells us that *it is so*. But do we assert upon experience that "whatsoever happens must have a cause?" No; experience can only tell us contingent truths, but not *necessary* truths; it can only tell us *what is*, it cannot tell us *what must be*. That *crabs are sour*, that *sugar is sweet*, that *bodies are heavy*, are physical facts merely. God might change them to-morrow, were He so minded. But that "whatever happens must have a cause" is a necessary truth. It is not merely what is, but what must be; and therefore it is not derived from experience, which only informs us what is, and not what must be. On similar grounds the Realists taught, following Plato, that universals were innate, such as *wisdom*, *virtue*, *beauty*. "Wise men perish," they said, "but that type or standard after which wise men are wise perishes not; beautiful things perish, but beauty is eternal; virtuous men perish, but virtue is eternal." Now eternal truth cannot be derived from experience, since experience only gives that which is, and not that which must be. These are the ideas of Plato, and the "*eternal reasons*" of St. Augustine. That they are innate, as to their integrity and perfection, is now no longer held; but that element which stamps upon them their characteristics of *universality* and *necessity*, strictly, is held to be innate; yet, besides this, an empirical element is admitted as the condition of their being realised in consciousness.

Is this the doctrine of St. Thomas—that the mind of man contains an element of eternal necessary truth? Beyond all

doubt he so teaches: "It is necessary to say that the human soul knows all things in the *rationes æternæ*, by participation of which we know all things. For the intellectual light which is within us is nothing else than a certain participated likeness of the increate light, in which are contained the *rationes æternæ*" (i. lxxxiv. 5).

Here Mr. Walker entertains some natural fears lest we should mistake St. Thomas for a Platonist. That, like St. Augustine, he followed the illustrious Plato in this particular, cannot, we think, be denied. His *rationes æternæ* answer also to the *à-priori* element of Kant, to the eternal truths which Fenelon considers divine, and to the impersonal reason of Cousin; for all these are radically the same, as any one who is conversant with their writings must admit. But our author thinks that the following passage will remove St. Thomas from the companionship of the greatest intellects in ancient or modern times: "However, besides the intellectual light within us, there are required intelligible species received from things, in order to obtain knowledge about material things; therefore it is not by the sole participation of *rationes æternæ* that we have knowledge of material things, as the Platonists laid down, who said that the sole participation of ideas sufficed for knowledge."* This passage might lead one to suppose that Plato denied the necessity of sensible experience in order to a knowledge of sensible things. That Plato held so absurd a doctrine, we do not believe for a moment;† that some Platonists might have exaggerated his views into absurdity, is very possible. But whatever may have been the case, it is hardly worth while to refute a doctrine which has been long ago dead, buried, and

* St. Thomas, quoted by Mr. Walker, p. 22.

† The Platonic doctrine of perception has been misrepresented by Aristotle and his disciples as well as by moderns—Bacon, Reid, Stewart, &c. Plato taught that the ideas had a latent but real existence in the soul prior to the act of perception, and on occasion of the impression on the bodily organs we become conscious of the ideas; so that sensible action is indispensably necessary as the condition of knowledge. Thus Sir W. Hamilton represents his doctrine. But Plato himself asserts the same thing in his *Phædo*. Bearing in mind that, according to Plato, knowledge is a remembrance of a previous state, we must be convinced that he considered sensations as necessary for that act of remembrance by the following passage: "But if, after having had it before we were born, we lose it at our birth, and afterwards, *through exercising the senses about these things*, we recover the knowledge which we once before possessed, would not that which we call learning be a recovery of our knowledge?" (*Phædo*, Cary's translation.) With regard to the assertion that, according to the Platonists, "*the sole participation of ideas [without sensations?] sufficed for knowledge*," it should be remembered that Plato disdained to call phenomenal knowledge by the name of knowledge: the word intelligence, or knowledge, he applies to the immutable ideas, the eternal reasons of things; the phenomenal world, he says, is apprehended "*by opinion and the senses*." (*Timæus*, xxvi.)

forgotten. We repeat what we asserted in the beginning, that the form of idealism which Mr. Walker refutes has no existence in the nineteenth century. Gioberti and Rosmini would agree with Kant, St. Thomas, and Mr. Walker, that sensation is necessary for the knowledge of sensible things. If they speak of "innate ideas," they mean the *rationes æternæ*; and here Mr. Walker agrees, or should in all consistency agree, with them. "The understanding," says Kant, "is the faculty of conceiving the object of sensible intuition. Neither of these faculties of the soul is preferable to the other; they are of equal importance: without sensibility no object would be given, and without understanding no object would be thought. Thoughts without matter, or without object, are vain: [sensible] intuitions without *conceptions* are blind. . . . Knowledge results from their union." Hence it is that Gioberti makes his "ideal formula" consist of three elements, viz. "*Ens*," or Absolute Being [the *rationes æternæ*]; *existentiæ*, or contingent being [the empirical element of Kant]; and creation, or the nexus between the two. Of the latter element we say nothing; but his doctrine, that Absolute Being and contingent are necessary to make up knowledge, adds nothing to the received doctrine of Kant.

But in order to show more clearly what is meant when it is said that it is necessary to admit an *à-priori* and an empirical element as the condition of knowledge, take the idea of Being, for example, which is sometimes called innate. Strive to think of it in all its universality, without any admixture of an empirical element; *i. e.* do not think of any particular being, but of being as the common attribute of all existing things. You cannot; it is an empty form: it is good for nothing without the empirical element. But neither is the empirical element of any use without the *à-priori* element. Suppose you lay your hand upon a table, you will experience a certain sensation; can the sensation itself inform you what is there? No, a feeling is only a feeling; but it is the mind which gives significancy to the sensations, and makes them reveal that there is a *something* which affects you. The sensations are "signs of things," says Gioberti; but signs mean nothing to those who cannot read them, nor do sensations mean any thing save to a mind which can understand. We cannot help thinking that Rosmini meant nothing more than the doctrine here expressed. He declares that there is one innate idea, the idea of *being*; that this idea possesses the characteristics of *universality* and *necessity* (the *rationes æternæ*); that it is the idea of possible, not of actual, existence—for actual beings are particular, but *being* is universal; that it is

the form of the understanding, and the sensations are related to it as the matter; that it is the very light of reason within us which distinguishes man from the brute creation; that it gives significancy to the sensations, which without it would be no more than blind feelings. But what will be the result if you endeavour to think of being in general, without thinking of any being in particular? What kind of an idea is that of possible being, exclusive of all things which actually exist? Rosmini himself repeatedly affirms that his "*ens in genere*" has no definite meaning without the sensations; he calls it "*vague*," "*undetermined*," the "*negation of all actuality*;" nay, he uses the very expression of Aristotle and St. Thomas, that the soul is a *tabula rasa* without the sensible element. When he describes his idea of being in general, he describes the characteristics of the *à priori* element recognised by Plato, by St. Augustine, by St. Thomas, and by Kant: and so far he is right; but we think him wrong in calling that element which is vague, undetermined, and the negation of all actuality, by the name *idea*. But whether our judgment upon the merits of Rosmini be correct or no, we only wished to instance his recognition of the necessity of the sensational element as an example that Mr. Walker's objections bear upon no form of idealism which is common amongst us at the present time. We could confidently make the assertion, that the majority of the objections which he opposes against the idealists are matters in which they are agreed with him. But the word "*idea*" is a great stumbling-block. Plato never applied that word to the empirical element of our knowledge (at least so Sir W. Hamilton declares, in a passage of his *Discussions*, which we cannot at present recover); when that word was used by the Platonists, it referred to necessary truth, or perhaps rather to that element of it which is admitted on all hands (except by sensationalists) as *à priori*. Later on, however, the word '*idea*' was used, and especially by Descartes, for every object in the mind, and by Locke for the very sensations themselves; whereas when Malebranche and Fénélon used the word they kept up its old signification. No wonder that there was some confusion, and that each party should regard the other's view as the height of absurdity. The *naïveté* with which Leibnitz admits the axiom of Aristotle, "*Nihil est in intellectu quod non prius in sensu—nisi ipse intellectus*," should have convinced both parties that there was not much to fight about, after all. But the truth is, "*idealism*" in those times meant simply a protest against the sensationalism which began to flood both England and the Continent.

The Spanish philosopher Balmez, therefore, states with

good reason, that had the question of "innate ideas" been properly stated, it would never have made such a stir in the scientific world as it has done. A still more recent writer expresses his belief that "a sage mediation" might have reconciled those great spirits, Plato and Aristotle. However this may be, for our part, we are thoroughly persuaded that on both sides of the question there has been a good deal of exaggeration, of mutual misconception, of mutual misrepresentation, and of quibbling about words; and that oftentimes both sides are right and both sides wrong, as in the story of the chameleon. The exaggerations and absurdities of the one side, and the exaggerations and absurdities of the other side, must be relinquished. If the extremes of idealism be very wrong, yet surely the *dirt philosophy*, as the Germans call sensationalism, is no better. The former leads to pantheism and egoism, and the latter to materialism and atheism: we cannot see that one of these roads to perdition is worse than the other; but the great thing is to admit the middle truth of which both extremes are an exaggeration. The idealist must be made to acknowledge that in such judgments as "whatsoever happens must have a cause," and in such conceptions as *man, camel, rose, being*, there is a sensational element, and that they cannot be thought of in their pure form; whilst the sensationalist must admit that there is an *à-priori* element, and that sensation, although it be the condition of knowledge, is impotent as far as intelligence is concerned, unless it be illumined by an *à-priori* element.

To blame Mr. Walker for what he has left undone, would be very unfair. He proposed to give a sketch of the system of St. Thomas on the origin of our knowledge; and in spite of some inaccuracies, he has fulfilled this aim so well, that we heartily recommend his treatise to the perusal of students in philosophy: but we trust that our motive will not be misconstrued if we venture to supply some information upon the latter portion of the question, which we deem of great importance,—we refer to the scholastic doctrine of perception by means of phantasm, which Mr. Walker thus describes in the words of St. Thomas: "But what is the connection of the senses with the intellect? For the senses are representatives of bodily impressions; the intellect apprehends only spiritual objects, and has notions, or ideas. Besides their own affections, the senses have a further office of sending up, as it were, what are called by St. Thomas phantasms concerning their own impressions. These phantasms are not material things; but are certain images or likenesses, the result of impressions made on the imagination. Such is the account St. Thomas himself gives."

Yes; but the student should know that the representative theory of perception is now universally exploded, notwithstanding the very venerable authority of the angelic doctor. No Catholic is bound to follow the opinion of St. Thomas upon merely speculative matters, nor is there any rashness or presumption in differing from him wherever there is good reason and weighty authority on the other side; and that in this instance there is both one and the other, we think can hardly be doubted. Philosophers who, like Bishop Berkeley and Fichte, have been sceptical about an outside world, have been so upon the principles laid down in the above citation. If any one can show that this is not the case, we shall be heartily glad, for the honour and glory of the Scholastics who have suffered so much unmerited abuse in modern times; but we fear he would have a difficult task. "The intellect," says St. Thomas, "apprehends *only spiritual objects*, and has notions or ideas." The same principle, advocated by Locke, led to the idealism of Berkeley and Hume: "Since the mind, in all its thoughts and reasonings, hath no other object but its own ideas, which it alone does or can contemplate, it is evident that our knowledge is only conversant about them" (book iv. c. i. § 1). Berkeley's fundamental principle is the same: "Things immediately perceived," he says, "are ideas; and ideas cannot exist without the mind, their essence consists in their being perceived" (Dialogues). In short—must we say it?—St. Thomas is an idealist, and consequently Mr. Walker too, in the modern sense of the word 'idealist;' for an *idealist* nowadays is not so much one who believes that there is an *à-priori* element in our knowledge, as one who is so intrenched within his own subjective states, that there is no egress into the world of things. Such is the consequence of St. Thomas's doctrine, which admits of no intuitive, *i. e.* immediate, knowledge of aught but ideas. For when we know absolute truth in his doctrine, it is only a "*participated likeness*" of absolute Being, and not the Absolute Himself, as was taught by the Realists; and again, when we know the material world according to St. Thomas, it is not the real earth, sun, moon and stars that we know, but certain representations of these objects, *viz. phantasms*. This theory of representational knowledge never received the entire assent of mankind even in the middle ages, but was opposed by a very respectable body among the schoolmen, called Realists, because they taught, *first*, that ideas properly so called [the eternal reasons] had a real existence in the mind of God; and *secondly*, that we perceive not the images of things, but the real things

themselves. In the middle ages St. Thomas would have been called a conceptualist, in modern times he is classed amongst idealists; but the two terms convey the same meaning. What gave rise to the representative theory was the axiom that "*like knows like*," which signifies that the object known must resemble the thinking subject; and hence what St. Thomas terms *the purification of the phantasms* by the intelligence, which rids them of material conditions and makes them spiritual objects—ideas; for the intellect, according to St. Thomas, "apprehends only spiritual objects, and has *notions* or *ideas*." It is curious, that in early Greece three philosophers taught exactly the opposite,—that the mind only knows what is unlike itself; these were Anaxagoras, Heraclitus, and Alcmaeon. However, men prefer on these matters to go rather by reason than authority. If we hold to the representative theory of perception, the objective world can either only be asserted as an hypothesis, or we must believe it, like Descartes and Malebranche, on the ground of the divine veracity; and either of these ways has grave difficulties. The idealist says, "It is true that my mind only immediately apprehends an image, and not a thing; but the image supposes the thing which it represents."* "How do you know that?" it is answered. "What means have you of comparing the copy with the original?"

"Who will dare to say," says Huet, "that the image or shadow or species which emanates from the exterior body presented to us is its truthful resemblance without any difference? By what skill, by what industry of my understanding, which judges the resemblance, can I compare the object with its image?"† Indeed, common sense tells that the sensations are not representative at all, and that nothing can resemble a sensation in one man except a sensation in another man. When one is pricked by a pin, no one believes that the painful feeling resembles the pin's point which pricked him. Certainly, we say that the meat tastes, and that the fire is hot; but no one means by this manner of expression that there is any thing in the fire *like* the feeling of heat, or any thing in the meat *like* the feeling of taste; but only that there is a quality in the object which causes these affections within us. So with sounds, colours, odours, and touch; inasmuch as they are sensations, they can only belong to a sentient being, and suppose nothing similar to them in any sense of the word similitude. But Reid and Sir William Hamilton have left us little original to say on this subject. Their doc-

* "Dicendum est quod ipsum phantasma est similitudo rei particularis." (Summ. 1, q. lxxxiv. art. 7 ad 2.)

† Huet, *Traité de la Faiblesse*, &c.

trine is now universally received, that the mind knows things immediately, and not through the medium of representative ideas. Sensation and perception go together, because sensation is the condition of perception; but they are thus distinguished—sensation results from the action of objects upon self, and perception is the mind's cognisance of the object which acts. Perception involves in its very signification a twofold element, subjective and objective; and the knowledge of one of these is not less immediate than the other. I am conscious of an object acting upon my senses just as immediately as I am conscious of the sensations of heat, cold, or sound which it produces. There is no inference from one to the other. The feeling involves something felt; the perception involves something perceived. This doctrine of immediate perception has the additional advantage of reconciling philosophy with common sense; for mankind at large are persuaded they perceive the real world, and not a world of ideas or images.

Here we take our farewell of Mr. Walker's pamphlet. He may differ from the views which we have laid down; but we think, whether these views are correct or not, it is important that students should be acquainted with them, simply because it is the philosophy of this nineteenth century in which we have to live and act. To revive Scholasticism is a very laudable endeavour; but it must be made to harmonise with the present, not to supersede it. In no other sense can the age of St. Thomas ever be revived; and the attempt at revival will only, in any other sense, resemble the galvanising of a corpse. Want of acquaintance with the philosophy of our days has led Mr. Walker into two errors: for first, he has refuted a form of idealism which does not exist; and secondly, he upholds a form of idealism which has been long ago exploded.

MOZART'S CORRESPONDENCE.

Mozart. Vie d'un Artiste chrétien au 18me siècle, extraite de sa Correspondance authentique, traduite et publiée pour la première fois en Français. Par J. Goschler, Chanoine Honoraire, Ancien Directeur du Collège Stanislas. Paris: Douniol.

WE have not the least doubt in the world that the honorary canon Goschler is a most worthy ecclesiastic. Nevertheless we are bound to accuse him of an act of considerable dis-

honesty in the literary way. The titles of books are sufficiently misleading, taken on an average. You open a novel, and find a disquisition on social enormities, Puseyism, or the rights of women. A traveller spends a few days in some really interesting place, or happens to have collected materials for a chapter of amusing gossip; to these he appends a bundle of rubbish as stale as it is dry, and forthwith deludes an unwary public by prefixing a title so designed as to conceal the true nature of the volume. But here we have the worthy canon perpetrating a similar, though not an identical, fraud, for a purpose quite different from that which animates the professional bookmaker. He has been smitten with an amiable desire to place the personal character of Mozart upon a different pedestal from that which it has hitherto occupied in the temple of genius; and having become acquainted with the somewhat voluminous remains of the correspondence of the Mozart family, he has promised on his title to exhibit the great musician as a type of the "Christian artist of the eighteenth century."

His title-page, however, is nothing to his preface. This latter is simple, amiable, and rhapsodical, to a degree which prepared us for the startling contrast between M. Goschler's promises and his performance. Still, we hardly anticipated so utter a break-down as the reality displays. Not only does the correspondence abruptly close more than four years before the death of Mozart, but it utterly fails in presenting him in the light in which M. Goschler wishes the critical world henceforth to behold him. It leaves Mozart, in truth, just where he was before,—amiable, lively, affectionate, and honourable in the ordinary course of social and domestic life; less strong or vigorous in character than susceptible and emotional; but as for his fervent "piety," which our enthusiastic canon would have us recognise as the master-spring of all his musical life, we fear it must still remain in those regions of the unknown where the morals and the religion of too many "Christian artists" of this and all ages are still obstinately lingering.

In fact, M. Goschler's preface is wonderfully like the report of a zealous missionary-society, which out of two or three small and insignificant facts constructs such flaming pictures of the progress of religion, that the simple hearer rises forthwith into ecstatic astonishment, and conceives the millennium to be actually at hand. Literally, we can detect not half a dozen phrases or sentences on which this entire glorification rests; and what the three chief of these, as selected by M. Goschler, are worth, the reader shall judge for himself.

Mozart's career was, says he, an "example of a Christian life in the midst of an existence altogether worldly, and of an ancient simplicity of manners in the midst of the corruptions of the end of the eighteenth century," which ought to be held up as a pattern to all young literary men and artists. All this rests, first, on a statement that Mozart and Haydn wrote the words "*In nomine Domini*" at the beginning of their manuscripts, and "*Laus Deo*" at the end,—a story resting on no authority whatever, and proving nothing if true; for otherwise we must believe thousands of French and other continental officials to be saints, because they "pray God to have in His holy keeping" every body they have to favour with a legal document.

Secondly, Mozart is proved a model for the artist world from his once replying to an anxious letter of his father's on his fête-day, that his father need not be disturbed about him, with the addition of two or three pious commonplaces. This very letter, too, where these commonplaces occur, furnishes a specimen of the worthy canon's coolness in manufacturing assertions; for he tells us in his preface, that in it we shall find Mozart "praying for strength from God, and placing all his works under the invocation of the patrons of his infancy, and of the pure Virgin whom he has learnt to know and to love;"—all which is absolutely a figment of our dreaming canon's brain.

Amusing enough, too, is his general reference to the letters, as showing "*passim*" that the musician referred all his glory and success to God; "*passim*" in this instance meaning much the same as "nowhere." And lastly, when Mozart receives a letter announcing his father's mortal illness, he replies in some well-expressed general remarks, indicating a knowledge of the true end of man, with expressions of satisfaction that nobody could call him morose and melancholy, and a statement that he never forgot how soon he might die. That this goes but little way in establishing a new character for his life is, however, only too palpable; and we sincerely regret to be driven to the conclusion that, so far as this volume is concerned, Mozart, however worthy a man, cannot be held up as a pattern of piety. That he died without wishing to receive the last Sacraments was, we believe, the case; and even our enthusiastic Goschler does not insinuate the reverse; though he quotes his words on his deathbed, addressed to his sister-in-law, "I wish you to see me die," as an illustration of the "fervour of his Christian faith, and the strength of a truly philosophical mind!"

With all its failure as a proof that Mozart was a model

Christian artist, M. Goschler's volume is nevertheless an agreeable addition to the literature of music, and presents on the whole a graphic picture of the life of the artist world. The astonishing precocity and wonderful powers of the young master are also brought out in a number of little curious details, always interesting to the musician, and often so to the general reader. The series is further curious as revealing to the uninitiated a little of the true state of affairs in the musical and theatrical worlds, and exhibiting what has to be encountered even by a Mozart from his own fellow musicians and composers. "The whole musical hell," the father calls one of the sundry cabals which beset the path of the young writer; and though he is not in the habit of using expressions equally strong, the letters abound with proofs of the vehemence of the opposition, and the bitterness of the contempt, which, like almost all the greatest masters, Mozart had to encounter on the part of the musical profession, not to mention the prejudices of amateurs and critics.

As a man, the personage who is painted in the most agreeable colours is the great composer's father, himself a musician and composer. A very large proportion of the letters in the volume are, in truth, by the elder Mozart; though, with characteristic inaccuracy, the editor has thought fit in his title-page to produce the impression that the book consists of the correspondence of *the* Mozart. That the father *was* what the credulous canon would fain have us believe the son to have been, is really probable. His letters, whether to his wife, his son, or his friends, are natural, acute, sensible, and unaffectedly religious; and whatever were the best features in the character of the son, it is plain that they resulted in no slight degree from the affectionate and sensible piety of the father. Little traits, too, of the generally happy condition of the family in their regards to one another fill up a pleasant picture of a united and well-conducted household.

The correspondence begins with the year 1762, when the family, consisting of the young prodigy, then but six years old, his father, his mother, and his sister, the last-named not yet thirteen, started on a musical tour from Salzburg to Vienna and elsewhere. Every where the marvellous powers of young Wolfgang created amazement. At Matthausen, the Franciscan friars rushed from their refectory as the sounds he brought forth from their church-organ reached them at dinner. At Stein, the young Orpheus charmed the soul of the customhouse-officer into a forgetfulness of the rigours of his duty with a minuet on the fiddle. At Vienna itself the boy was petted by the ladies of the imperial family.

One day two of the archduchesses took him to walk up and down the palace, and he tumbled upon the polished floor. One of the two took no notice; but the other helped him to get up, and caressed him. "You are very kind," said the boy; "I will marry you." The good-natured princess was Marie Antoinette, afterwards queen of France. At Stuttgart, the Mozarts had a specimen of the opposition which they would have to encounter from the jealousy of musicians already in possession of the highest posts of the profession in the contempt with which Jomelli scouted the pretensions of the young German, persuading the prince in whose service he was enlisted that no child from Germany could possess the musical genius which fame attributed to little Wolfgang.

The stay at Paris brings out the elder Mozart as a critic on the taste, the morals, and the manners of the French court and French ladies. His honest German heart and notions of right revolted at every thing he saw and heard. Ladies "painted like the dolls of Nuremberg;" morals to correspond; the great "miracles," as he calls them, being wrought by women who were neither "maid, wife, nor widow;" and society generally such, that he clearly foresaw the utter destruction which overwhelmed the nation thirty years afterwards. The solo-singing he found execrable, the chorus-singing good. Then he describes the vagaries of Parisian dress, and the fashion of enveloping every portion of the body in a wilderness of furs. Of course there raged an internecine war between the lovers of French music and German music. "*Toute la musique française ne vaut pas le diable*," says the German auditor, anticipating, however, a rapid improvement.

Money flowed in but slowly upon the travellers, though the whole party were most kindly treated by the royal family. All the letters with which they came furnished from ambassadors and nobles proved worthless, though they were so numerous that the elder Mozart says he could make "a litany" of them. One only friend they found, thanks to the recommendation of a simple merchant of Frankfort; and it was under the auspices of M. Grimm they found their visit not quite unprofitable. "*Voilà*," writes the elder Mozart, "*ce que peut un homme qui a du bons sens, et un bon cœur!*"

From Paris the party crossed the water to London, and gave a concert. The expenses startled their German understandings; but the majority of the musicians employed refused their fees. These were quite as high then as now,—five or six guineas to a solo singer; three, four, or five, to a leading

instrumentalist ; and nothing less than half-a-guinea to the most ordinary player. One of the father's letters from London gives so agreeable an impression of his personal character that we must translate it entire, as it is but short :

"Chelsea, Sept. 13, 1764.

On account of my illness, we have taken a house here in Five-field Row. Among my London friends is one Siprantini, a great amateur on the violoncello. He is the son of a Dutch Jew. After travelling in Italy and Spain, he found that the faith, ceremonies, and laws of Judaism were absurd, and abandoned his religion. I talked to him on the subject of religion ; and after a long conversation perceived that he was satisfied to believe in a God, to love Him first, and in the second place to love his neighbour as himself, and to live as an upright man. I took some trouble to give him some ideas on our faith ; and I brought him so far as to agree with me that of all Christian confessions the Catholic faith is the best. By and by I shall make a fresh attack ; but one must advance gently. Well, perhaps I shall become a missionary in England."

Notwithstanding the illness here referred to, and severe attacks which almost deprived him of both his children, the father's letters from England convey the idea that they were satisfied with the results of the visit.

Returning to Vienna, the correspondence sketches the condition of fashionable amusements in lively colours, and with considerable severity. We extract one of these pictures for the benefit of those who are eternally lamenting over the decay of taste in modern times, and who devoutly believe that when the "classical" masters wrote, the popular taste was more able to appreciate them than it is now :

"The Viennese in general care nothing for serious and reasonable things, of which they have no idea, or scarcely any ; they like to hear of nothing but follies, and take no pleasure in any thing but trivialities, dances, diableries, phantasmagorias, conjurings, pantomimes, pasquinades, apparitions, and decorations. You will see in the theatres daily a fine gentleman covered with crosses applauding a gross joke, laughing himself out of breath at a harlequin's indecency ; while during the most serious, beautiful, and touching scenes, he will chatter to a lady in her box so loud that his better neighbours can hear nothing of what is going on."

Then he tells of the dirty intrigues through which success of any kind was to be attained, and of the jealousies, oppositions, and calumnies through which they had to struggle. By the way, we must not forget to mention, for the instruction of believers in the good old times of art, that at this period, in Vienna itself, the tragic operas of Gluck were performed by *buffo* singers ; so complete was the dearth of actors and singers of a higher stamp.

Next came the labour and the disappointments incident to the composition and bringing out of an opera written at the emperor's suggestion by the young Mozart. We have not space to follow him and his anxious father through all the annoyances, cabals, and postponements which gave them a foretaste of what were to be the accompanying circumstances of many of the masterpieces which now delight the world. National ignorance, professional jealousy, singers' complaints, princely caprices, popular incredulity,—these and all the other well-known elements of theatrical and musical heart-burnings promised to give the first publicly represented opera of the marvellous youth a stormy birthday. Then came all the plagues of rehearsals, the conversion of many opponents into supporters, and finally an appeal to the emperor. All, however, was vain. The musicians and others in possession of reputation and place, were too strong for the cause of genius and candour; it became so clear that party-spirit would ruin the performance, that in the end it was all given up.

The end of the year 1768 brought the entire party home again to Salzburg; and the following year was spent in study. Early in 1770, the father and son started for an Italian tour; applause and kind receptions met them in most places, but as a *paying* affair the speculation was not very successful. At Rome, young Mozart went to the Sistine; and afterwards wrote down the notes of the famous *Miserere* of Allegri, which it was forbidden to *copy* under pain of excommunication, and which even now is only sold in Rome with a false editor's and publisher's name. The story is told in a letter from the father to his wife. Both at Rome and Naples they were well received; but the morals and manners of the latter filled the respectable German father with disgust; and he tells his wife that he will leave all the loveliness of the country with resignation, on account of the "universal filth, the crowds of beggars, the abominable and even impious character of the people, the bad education of the children, the incredible dissipation and the extravagant agitation to be found even in the churches." Of the king he says, "It is better to speak than to write what sort of a personage is his Neapolitan majesty."

The son now and then adds a postscript to the father's letters, usually gay and amusing, and sometimes enlivened with touches of good-humoured satire. A quick sense of the ridiculous is, in fact, to be detected in many parts of the younger Mozart's correspondence. His letters all express good spirits and animation; while of that overflowing sweetness and sentiment, which pervade even his professedly comic

music, there are few indications. A certain weakness of character is also too evident in many little signs; and the father's own letters betray his keen consciousness of the true nature of his wonderful son's mind, and his dread lest his firmness should be far from equal to his genius. It is, no doubt, most unfair to judge a young man by comparing his letters with those of a man of mature age; but still, after making every allowance, the contrast between the manliness and power displayed in Beethoven's correspondence (with all his faults) and that of Mozart is sufficiently striking.

The following postscript to one of his father's letters, written from Bologna, shows Mozart's lively appreciation of the ludicrous, and his early quickness in detecting men's real character :

"I live always, always gay. To-day I had a fancy for riding on a donkey; for it is the fashion in Italy, and therefore I thought I must try it. We have the honour to be acquainted with a certain Dominican who passes for a saint. I don't much believe in this, however; for I have seen him begin his breakfast with a large cup of chocolate, and take upon that a large glass of Spanish wine. Moreover I have had the advantage of dining with this saint, who drank largely of wine during the whole meal, which he finished with a large glass of the strongest wine, two good slices of melon, with peaches, pears, five cups of coffee, a plate of little cakes, and some thick citron cream. But perhaps he ate all this for mortification; nevertheless I hardly believe it. This would be too much for one time; and moreover, besides his dinner, he takes too much care about his supper."

From Italy the father and son returned home; and the correspondence begins again with the next tour. We cannot, however, follow them from place to place; which is the less needful, as there is a considerable tameness in the letters, many of which are not worth publication. Like too many editors, M. Goschler never knows when to stop; and as he himself understands little or nothing about the musical details, he has been unable to discriminate between what was merely trivial gossip, and what was worth preserving for the completion of his picture.

Taken altogether, and compared with the story of many a great artist, the career of Mozart, notwithstanding the cabals often raised against his works, was a successful one. There can be little doubt that he possessed many elements of success, in agreeable manners, a lively disposition, a good-natured sense of the ludicrous, and, unfortunately for himself, a too ready facility in yielding to the wishes of others, his inferiors in every way. A long letter from home, addressed to him

when he was residing in Paris, expresses the father's anxieties for the faith, the morals, and the temporal prospects of the brilliant youth, with a force quite painful to read. "You have plenty of good sense, if you will but use it," is the idea which pervades this and others of his letters. "Never fear, I fully trust myself," is the pervading idea of the replies. The best possible feeling seems to have always existed between them; and there can be little doubt that the death of the father, though the son was then thirty-two years old, was too soon for the permanent happiness of a character so brilliant and volatile, so susceptible and pliant.

Short Notices.

MISCELLANEOUS LITERATURE.

Missionary Travels and Researches in South Africa. By David Livingstone. (London, Murray.) The words 'mission' and 'missionary' are used in several senses, among which the commercial now preponderates. Mr. Livingstone may have the ultimate view of Christianising Africa; but his means,—the things to which here and now he directs his energies,—are commercial relations, opening up new roads, and finding new markets for British produce. Though we cannot look at him as a model of the Christian missionary, we must concede that he is a very remarkable man, who makes less fuss about a sixteen years' residence in the interior of Africa than many a dandy tourist makes of a single camel-journey across the desert. He is one of those Scotchmen of humble origin who by force of character have raised themselves to fame; and he fully deserves it. He is of a Highland family. "Our ancestors," he says, "were Roman Catholics; they were made Protestants by the laird coming round with a man having a yellow staff, which would seem to have attracted more attention than his teaching; for the new religion went long afterwards—perhaps it does so still—by the name of 'the religion of the yellow-stick.'" In his youth he was a literary factory-boy; his favourite books were those on science, to the disgust of his father, who wanted him to read *The Cloud of Witnesses*, or Boston's *Fourfold State*. "Our difference of opinion reached the point of open rebellion on my part; and his last application of the rod was on my refusal to peruse Wilberforce's *Practical Christianity*." The young man then became a surgeon, with the intention of qualifying himself as a Chinese explorer; but falling in with the London Missionary Society, he was employed by it in Africa, to the advantage of commerce certainly, if not of religion. His African experiences are most interesting, and told with vigour if not with refinement. He is very modest about his style: he owns himself to be perfectly inexperienced, and would have employed some one to compile the book from his notes if he had found it possible. He has increased his respect for literary men by enrolling himself among their number: "Those who have never carried a book through the press, can form no idea of the amount of toil it involves. The process has increased my respect for authors and authoresses a thousandfold."

Essays on the Early Period of the French Revolution. By the late Rt. Hon. J. W. Croker; reprinted, with additions, from the *Quarterly Review*. (London, Murray.) These are very important and able essays: the first intended to demolish M. Thiers' credit as a historian; the second, a good picture of the private life of Louis XVI. and Marie Antoinette; the fifth, a history of the captivity of the royal family in the Temple; and the three last on Robespierre, the revolutionary tribunals, and the guillotine. Mr. Croker's sympathies were with the right persons; and he writes about these matters in an infinitely better spirit than any Whig or Radical could have done. The volume is well worth reading.

FOREIGN LITERATURE.

Le livre Examen de la Vérité de la Foi.—Liberty of examining the Truth of the Faith: Conversations on the Catholic Demonstration of the Christian Revelation. By V. Deschamps, C.S.S.R. (Tournay and Paris, Casterman.) The idea of this remarkable and elaborate work is extremely simple: in this it is a true work of art; it is but the development of a thought which the author had previously expressed, and which he says was first suggested by some passages in a letter of Fénelon's. The idea is this; in the demonstration of Catholicity, the Church is an axiom that has not to be proved, but to be seen. If we must prove the Church by arguments, we get into the same impossibility as that which nullifies Protestantism; for it is as bad to prove the Church out of the Scriptures and fathers, as to prove the individual doctrines of the Church from them,—the same gate is opened to all quibblings, doubts, and dishonesties in one case as in the other. This dialectic method is all very well in the reflex sense: after we have recognised the Church and obeyed her, then we may trace her back in history and in documents; but in herself she is set on a hill—she is visible not in history, to the eye of the student only, but in the world, to the eye of every man that passes along the roadway of life. “The ignorant man,” says Fénelon, “has no need either of reading or reasoning to find the true Church; without opening his eyes, he knows with certainty that all those sects which would make him their judge are false, and that the only one that can be true is the one which commands him to believe humbly. Instead of books and arguments, all he wants is the consciousness of his own impotence and of God's goodness; and he will never be seduced by the flatteries of those who make him the judge of religion. . . . So in the case of the learned; . . . let him reject a discussion visibly impossible, and a presumption evidently ridiculous (namely, that he is the supreme judge of revelation), and he is a Catholic.” For all Catholic countries, and for many that we call Protestant, this argument is most true. “How can people call Holland a Protestant country?” observed a very distinguished member of the bar who had spent his vacation there with his family; “the only religion that is *visible* there is the Catholic.” Protestantism shows itself negatively: streets like Oxford Street, a mile and a half long, without a place of worship from one end to the other; closed doors where there is a church; and a general and evident absence of all the means of grace,—such is the visible presence of Protestantism; a visibility that consists in being invisible. Catholicity in these countries is the only positive religion that comes before men's eyes.

This consideration leads us to doubt whether F. Deschamps' book is exactly what is wanted for England. Here our poor countrymen are

deceived by a sham. They have, each in his own place, the country church and churchyard, where the ashes of their ancestors rest; tombs of crusaders are around them as they worship; they congregate after service under the same yew-tree whence their fathers cut the bows they carried at the battle of Cressy. The inside of the church may be damp and mouldy; but there is the old clergyman with his surplice, with the same sleepy old sermon that they heard thirty years ago. It is a dull, but it is a visible religion. As soon as men can widen their horizon beyond the boundaries of their parish, the prestige of the thing begins to fail, and the Church of England to split up into as many churches as there are congregations; but we can easily fancy the old-fashioned, anti-locomotive Englishman living in perfect good faith under the shadow of his steeple, and believing it to be the Catholic Church which he weekly confesses in the Creed.

Correspondence.

CATHOLICITY IN INDIA.

To the Editor of the Rambler.

DEAR MR. EDITOR,—At p. 389 of the last *Rambler*, a statement is made that the Christians of Tinnevelly were left so destitute of the means of grace that they threw themselves at the feet of the Vicars-Apostolic, and said, "Give us missionaries, or we turn Protestants;" and that 40,000 of them fulfilled the threat.

On reading this, one cannot help speculating a little, by the way, on the funny state of mind the people must have been in to make and execute such a threat. That there *are*, however, funny and most unphilosophical states of mind in the world, is beyond controversy. But the fact here quoted is, I think, very doubtful; and as it is not to the credit either of the Christians of Tinnevelly or their ecclesiastical superiors, I am unwilling that it should pass as true if it is not so.

All I know of the matter is this, that about the year 1845, or earlier, a great fuss was made amongst missionary societies in England because it was said that not forty, but seventy, thousand Tinnevellians were ready to embrace "gospel truth;" and the late Bishop of London busied himself in sending out some missionaries who might gather in the ripe harvest that was awaiting their hands.

With one of these missionaries I travelled a part of the way out there; he was very full of the great things that were going to be done at Tinnevelly. But two or three months' residence there dispelled the illusion; and when I met him again shortly after, he told me that the whole thing was a humbug so palpable that he could not stand it; and that the only foundation for the report was that there had been a quarrel between the head men of some tribes or villages, and that one of them had, out of spite, threatened to make all his people turn Protestants.

Does this refer to something different, or is the writer of the article on Catholicity misinformed?—I remain, dear Mr. Editor,

14th December 1857.

Yours faithfully, W.

[We are glad to receive this contradiction. The author of the first part of the article composed it abroad, and on such evidence as he could get; and very likely gave credit to the published statistics of some Protestant society.—ED.]